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3Act LVIII of 2001 on the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, which entered into effect on 13 July 2001, defines the
primary objective of Hungary’s central bank as the achievement and maintenance of price stability. Low
inflation allows the economy to function more effectively, contributes to better economic growth over
time and helps to moderate cyclical fluctuations in output and employment.
In the inflation targeting system, from August 2005 the Bank seeks to attain price stability by ensuring
an inflation near the 3 per cent medium term objective. The Monetary Council, the supreme decision-
making body of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank, performs a comprehensive review of the expected devel-
opment of inflation every three months, in order to establish the monetary conditions that are consistent
with achieving the inflation target. The Council’s decision is the result of careful consideration of a wide
range of factors, including an assessment of prospective economic developments, the inflation outlook,
money and capital market trends and risks to stability.
In order to provide the public with a clear insight into the operation of monetary policy and enhance
transparency, the Bank publishes the information available at the time of making its monetary policy
decisions. The Quarterly Report on Inflation presents the forecasts prepared by the Economics
Department for inflation, as well as the macroeconomic developments underlying the forecast. The fore-
casts of the Economics Department are based on certain assumptions. Hence, in producing its fore-
cast, the Economics Department assumes an unchanged monetary and fiscal policy. In respect of eco-
nomic variables exogenous to monetary policy, the forecasting rules used in previous issues of the
Report are applied.
The analyses in this Report were prepared by the Economics Department staff under the general direction of Ág-
nes CSERMELY, Head of Department. The project was managed by Barnabás FERENCZI, Deputy Head of the
Economics Department, together with Attila CSAJBÓK, Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division,
Balázs VONNÁK, Deputy Head of the Monetary Assessment and Strategy Division, Mihály András KOVÁCS,
Deputy Head of the Conjunctural Assessment and Projections Division, and Zoltán M. JAKAB, Head of the Model
Development Unit. The Report was approved for publication by István HAMECZ, Managing Director.
Primary contributors to this Report also include, Judit ANTAL, Zoltán GYENES, Cecilia HORNOK, Zoltán M. JAKAB,
Péter KOROKNAI, Mihály András KOVÁCS, Zsolt LOVAS, András OSZLAY, Gábor PULA, András REZESSY, Dáni-
el PALOTAI, Barnabás VIRÁG, Balázs VONNÁK. Other contributors to the analyses and forecasts in this Report
include various staff members of the Economics Department and the Monetary Instruments and Markets
Department, Statistics Department. Translated by Sándor FAZEKAS, Éva LI, Edit MISKOLCZY and Éva TAMÁSI. 
The Report incorporates valuable input from the MNB’s other departments as well as the Monetary Council’s com-
ments and suggestions following its meetings on 8 August and 22 August 2005. However, the projections and
policy considerations reflect the views of the Economics Department staff and do not necessarily reflect those of
the Monetary Council or the MNB.
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7Overview
The past period saw favourable developments in inflation, with the
CPI falling to 3–4 per cent and core inflation below 2 per cent. This
moderation in core inflation was attributable to a gradual pick-up
in import competition, which reined in prices and evolved against
a background of a stable forint exchange rate, as well as modest
growth in consumer demand. Corporate wage adjustment to an
environment of lower inflation seems to have begun.
Simultaneously, the equilibrium position of the economy also
improved slightly, even though the current account deficit contin-
ues to be high. The impact of the unfavourable equilibrium situa-
tion on risk perception is currently offset by very strong demand in
the global capital markets for assets in high-risk investment cate-
gories. Thus, the past few months have been marked by relative
stability and a moderate decline in yields.
Currently, the prospective economic developments for 2006-2007 are
surrounded by higher-than-usual uncertainty. The main underlying
reason for this is that the Government has announced a number of
measures that may significantly influence economic growth, the exter-
nal balance and, indirectly, risk perception. However, as these meas-
ures are not comprehensive, it will only be possible to assess their
overall impact when budgets for the coming years are disclosed.
If only the government measures announced so far and the deter-
minations arising from the temporary nature of the measures
aimed at improving the 2005 balance were taken into considera-
tion, and no offsetting measures were to be taken, the GDP-pro-
portionate fiscal deficit would grow by over 3 per cent by 2007,
accompanied by a considerable deterioration in the current
account balance. This economic path cannot be sustained over
the long term, as Hungary’s increasingly rapid indebtedness
would undermine the ability to finance economic activity, and lead
to a permanent and marked slowdown in growth.
As an alternative path, we could assume that, in the interest of
reducing the budget deficit as undertaken in the Convergence
Programme, the Government offsets the impact of the measures
announced by taking steps expressly designed to curb demand,
and also materially reduces the fiscal deficit. Although such a path
undoubtedly points to long-term sustainability, structural reform of
An environment of low inflation
with equilibrium risks
Increasing number of question
marks concerning the fiscal path
rendering the outlook fragile
general government would be necessary to counteract the current
trend towards a much higher deficit.
Therefore, a middle-of-the-road solution was employed in this Report.
We assume that over the next two years wages will rise slowly, while
operational costs and capital investment remain flat in general gov-
ernment. Under such a scenario, fiscal policy would still boost
demand in 2006, but the demand impact would become slightly neg-
ative in 2007. An important assumption with respect to the inflation
projection is that the forecasts are mirrored in the exchange rate set
in the usual manner and an unchanged interest rate. Thus, implicitly,
we expect financial markets to perceive this fiscal adjustment as sat-
isfactory and accordingly the current favourable risk perception
remains unchanged. On the forecast horizon, the major differences
between the individual economic paths are attributable to risk per-
ception and hence yields and future developments in the exchange
rate. Relative to this, the actual extent of the fiscal demand effect will
precipitate much smaller shifts in the inflation projection.
In our opinion, provided that all these assumptions hold true, the
economy could, after a temporary detour, slowly return to a path
leading to economic equilibrium and nominal stability. The Report
introduces this economic path, emphasising that the projection in
it is conditional upon assumptions stronger than ever.
Relying on these assumptions, we project that demand will be
stronger than previously anticipated due to fiscal easing. However,
the impact of demand on inflation will be offset by supply-side
measures. Thus, on the forecast horizon, following a temporary
decline in 2006, we expect inflation to stabilise at around 3 per cent.
Stronger economic growth results from the acceleration of con-
sumption generated by government measures. A fall in the CPI
brought about by the reduction in VAT rates, income tax cuts and
the increases in the family support scheme will all raise house-
holds’ real income. We expect stable growth in the external busi-
ness cycle. In line with stable business cycle perspectives,
exports and corporate investment are expected to continue to
grow at a steady pace. Overall, due to trends in consumption and
economic growth which are higher than the long-term average,
demand-pull inflation is expected to rise.
On the supply side, contrasting trends are expected to emerge. It
is difficult to predict the effects of the sizeable, differentiated mini-
mum wage increase scheduled for 2006. Overall, we expect
We assume a restrained fiscal 
policy and stable monetary 
conditions  
Along the central path
increasingly vigorous household
demand 
generates inflationary pressure,
which, over the longer term, 
is offset by a moderate increase in
labour costs.
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Thus, inflation is expected to
stand at around 3% with a 
symmetrical balance of risks to
the central projection.
declining wage inflation to come to a halt only temporarily. Over
the second half of the period that our forecast horizon spans, fac-
tors reducing inflation may become dominant again, due to the
envisaged tax measures (abolition of health care contributions and
reduction in social security taxes) which will reduce labour costs.
Unit labour costs, along with an expected increase in productivity,
may support disinflation.
Consistent with earlier practice, in the distribution of risks in the
inflation projection we have not quantified the potential impact of
possible changes in forint risk premia, although, as we have point-
ed out, we perceive greater-than-usual uncertainty in this area.
Both the upside and downside risks to our conditional inflation pro-
jection are roughly equal.
Faster growth in consumption may pose an upside risk to infla-
tion. Another upside risk to inflation may be represented by the
fact that the rise in the minimum wage may, in addition to an
immediate increase in labour costs, result in upward pressure on
wages feeding through over the longer term. Despite this, how-
ever, temporary disinflation in 2006 will cool inflation expectations
over the longer term and thus increase the likelihood of lower
inflation. Further sources of uncertainty around the projection
include the usual factors such as the global market price of oil,
domestic price regulations and extreme fluctuations in
unprocessed food prices.
Fan chart of the inflation projection
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Uncertainty around measuring
imports renders the assessment 
of growth and the external 
balance difficult
Foreign trade developments represent higher-than-usual uncer-
tainty, as such developments directly affect the current account
deficit and may influence economic growth statistics and indirect-
ly affect the risk perception of the economy. Hungary’s EU acces-
sion last year led to methodological changes in recording foreign
trade data, with earlier statistical recording at customs borders
replaced by self-declaration-based recognition. Following these
changes, the amount of imports recorded in statistics has been
lower since 2004 H2 than what would be justified by the business
cycle. Currently, the causes of these changes cannot be identified
for lack of a satisfactory amount of information. However, in our
opinion, import demand is unlikely to have decreased to such an
extent in Hungary. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that
some of the improvement in net exports may be a temporary fea-
ture arising from methodological changes.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Summary table of the main scenario
Projections are conditional, with the main scenario reflecting the projection that applies only 
if all of the assumptions presented in section 3 materialise; unless otherwise specified, 
percentage changes on a year earlier
1
For technical reasons, our projected indicator may, over the short term, be different from the index published by the CSO. Our longer term indicators,
however, both follow identical trends. 
2
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) indicator; negative values denote contraction in aggregate
demand. 
3
In the case of the general government sector, the thirteenth-month salary for 2004 which was disbursed in January 2005 causes a downward
bias in the wage increase indicator for 2004, and an upward one in that for 2005. 
4
According to the CSO Labour Force Survey.
* Assumption for the fiscal impulse inherently consistent with the macroeconomic path; due to the lack of an effective act on the 2006-07 budget, we can-
not provide a detailed fiscal projection ** The uncertainty in trade statistics (see section 4.3) may imply a higher current account deficit / external financ-
ing requirement by near 1 percent of GDP for 2005. *** Our projection allows for the impact of the procurement of Gripen planes on the current account
and its contribution to an increase in public consumption and imports. **** Excluding the leap year effect; original data in brackets ***** MNB estimate.
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual / Estimate Projection
CPI (annual average)
Core inflation
1
4.8 5.8 2.2 1.1 3.2
Consumer price index 4.7 6.8 3.6 1.6 2.9
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 0.7 1.9 1.6 2.0 2.0
Fiscal demand impact
2
-0.5 -0.5 0.8 0.5-1.0* -0.5-0.0*
Household consumption 7.2 2.5 2.4 3.5 3.0
Gross fixed capital formation 2.5 7.9 5.4 4.9 2.1
Domestic absorption 5.7 2.2 1.2 5.7*** 2.7***
Exports 7.8 14.9 11.1 8.8 9.2
Imports 11.0 11.6 8.0 10.6*** 7.9***
GDP 2.9 4.0 (4.2)**** 3.6 (3.4)**** 3.9*** 3.8***
Current account deficit
As a per cent of GDP 8.8 8.9 7.6** 8.6*** 7.6***
EUR billions 6.4 7.1 6.7** 8.0*** 7.6***
External borrowing requirement
As a per cent of GDP 8.8 8.4 6.9** 7.8*** 6.8***
Labour market
Whole-economy
3
10.9 6.1 8.2 6.5 5.4
Whole-economy employment
4
1.2 -0.5 -0.3 0.1 0.6
Private sector gross average wage 8.7 9.3 6.8 7.2 5.6
Private sector employment
4
0.7 -0.3 0.2 0.4 1.0
Private sector unit labour cost 6.5 3.1 2.9 2.1 0.2
Real disposable income of households 3.9***** 4.0***** 3.7 4.6 2.1
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Developments in the international financial mar-
kets significantly influenced the exchange rate of
the forint and yields on government securities in
2005 H1. Overall, global propensity for taking risks
was comfortably high, with risk indicators reaching
a historically low level. This was coupled with per-
sistently low long-term euro and US dollar yields,
despite the fact that the Federal Reserve has
raised the federal funds rate by a total of 125 basis
points on five occasions this year.
The period since the beginning of 2005 can be
divided into three parts. The first one between
January and mid-March was marked by increasing-
ly strong risk appetite and a rise in global demand
for high-risk bonds. The second phase between
March and May was a time of downward adjust-
ment, for which the main underlying reason was the
deteriorating risk perception of corporate bonds.
The rise in corporate risk also raised premiums on
riskier sovereign bonds, although to a lesser extent.
Hence, demand for local currency-denominated
assets of emerging markets also declined. In May,
investor sentiment changed again, accompanied
by a decline in the premium on both corporate and
riskier sovereign bonds. By historical standards, the
global investment environment has remained
favourable. However, because of global imbal-
ances and the level of long-term US yields, which
remained low despite the current tightening cycle,
many observers perceive the situation as fragile.
Trends in the global market also affected CEE
markets. On certain occasions, there was strong
co-movement between the Czech, Polish,
Hungarian and Slovak currencies, whilst country-
specific factors were pushed into the background.
Price and yield data as well as investment banks’
analyses suggest that the risk perception of the
new EU Member States has been even more
favourable than the general perception of emerg-
ing markets.
In keeping with high international risk appetite and
improving assessment of the CEE region, forint
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Chart 1-1 
Long-term EUR and USD yields and risk indicators
* EMBI Global Composite: interest premium index of sovereign and quasi-
sovereign issuers’ dollar-denominated bonds as calculated by JP Morgan-
Chase.
** Merill Lynch US High Yield Master II index.
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Chart 1-2 
Changes in the exchange rates of the currencies in the
region vis-à-vis the euro
yields have declined since early this year. The fall
in yields was the most substantial in the case of
shorter-term government securities. While the 10-
year benchmark yield remained broadly flat
between early January and late May, its 3-month
counterpart declined by close to 2 percentage
points. A new wave of falling yields in early June
resulted in a parallel shift in the yield curve: after
being nearly flat at 7% in May, it dropped to near-
ly 6%. Regarding the Maastricht interest criterion,
the 12-month moving average of the 10-year
benchmark yield has lately come closer to the ref-
erence value.
The forward yield curve derived from yields in the
government securities market can be considered
a good approximation of expected future yields.
The shift in the forward yield curve reveals that
yields expected within 5 years have fallen signifi-
cantly, while yield expectations over a period of
longer than 5 years only declined perceptibly in
the second part of July. 
Short-term yields mainly follow the MNB’s key inte-
rest rate and expectations regarding such. In
keeping with the improving inflation outlook and a
more favourable perception of short-term risks, the
Monetary Council has lowered its two-week
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Benchmark yields in the government securities market
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Chart 1-5
Derived 3-month forward yield curves
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Chart 1-6
Anticipated path of the central bank base rate based on
the forward yield curve
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Chart 1-4
Maastricht interest criterion
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deposit rate, i.e. its key policy rate, by 300 basis
points to 6.75% in several successive steps this
year. Another 75 basis point fall has been priced
into short-term yields for the remainder of 2005.
Although the current key policy rate and expecta-
tions for end-2005 are much lower than anticipated
by market participants in January, the exchange
rate of the forint has not weakened vis-à-vis the
euro overall, despite the wide range in which it has
moved. This suggests that the base rate cuts have
been made possible by a significant fall in risk pre-
mium on forint-denominated assets. Meanwhile,
macro-analysts’ inflation expectations have not
deteriorated, an obvious interpretation of which is
that, according to market participants, the easing
of monetary conditions was in line with the
improvement of inflation developments.
As reflected by the shift in the yield curve, the
decline in the expected risk premia has materi-
alised mainly in the form of falling short-term
yields. By contrast, forward rates 5 year ahead
have remained high. The forint premium over 5-
year euro forward rates 5 years ahead, an indi-
cator of key interest for money market partici-
pants, has been moving in a 150–200 basis point
range for practically one and a half years. By
comparison, it has been below 100 basis points
in the case of the Polish, Czech and Slovak cur-
rencies for several months now. In addition to
the general assessment of the CEE region, this
premium reflects the likelihood of Hungary’s
entry into the euro area as well as the market
perception of the external balance and conver-
gence. Reuters surveys indicate that in 2005 no
improvement has occurred in either the expect-
ed date of the introduction of the euro in Hunga-
ry, or the expectations for balance indicators
that influence the speed of convergence. This is
in turn consistent with the persistently high for-
ward premium.
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The EUR/HUF exchange rate
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Expectations for the key policy rate based on the
Reuters surveys
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Chart 1-9
Premia over 5-year euro forward rates 5 years ahead
Another indication of the persistently unfavourable
perception of long-term risks is that despite a
healthy global risk appetite and falling forint yields,
foreign investors’ long position has shrunk on the
whole. Their interest in forint-denominated govern-
ment securities has been moderate. It should be
noted, however, that one reason for this may be
the fact that the State Debt Management Agency
has shifted more strongly to financing in foreign
currency, which has led to a slower rise in the
stock of forint-denominated government bonds.
The real effective exchange rate and the forward-
looking real interest rate, which are important in
terms of monetary policy’s impact on inflation,
both eased in 2005 H1. In the case of the
exchange rate, this can be ascribed to the weak-
ening of the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar, as reflect-
ed in the nominal effective exchange rate of the fo-
rint. The decline in the real interest rate is attribut-
able to nominal yields which have fallen more rap-
idly than inflation expectations. Based on the
Reuters survey, macro-analysts expect the real
effective exchange rate to weaken further. The
anticipated increase in real interest rates in 2006
is the outcome of lower VAT rates mitigating infla-
tion temporarily, and as such it does not represent
actual tightening for all economic participants.
Overall, judging from analysts’ expectations, mon-
etary conditions are expected to shift towards eas-
ing over the coming year, however without leading
to an increase in inflation.
The decline in yields and exchange rate appreci-
ation which started in early June were slightly dif-
ferent from the developments of this year as a
whole. Yields fell significantly at longer maturities,
due to declines in forward rates at the longer end.
The spread over five-year euro forwards five years
ahead fell from 200 basis points to 150 basis
points. In spite of the fact that currencies in the
region depreciated significantly and stayed below
their June levels for several weeks, appreciation of
the forint exchange rate remained unbroken in
early July.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Chart 1-10
Expectations for equilibrium indicators on the basis of
the Reuters surveys
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Chart 1-11
The CPI-based real exchange rate*
* Real effective exchange rate, 2000 average = 100 per cent. Higher values
denote real appreciation. Our estimates of expectations for end-2005 and
2006 are based on a Reuters consensus on inflation and the exchange
rate. We assumed that inflation in trading partner countries would not
change, relative to a year-on-year average, and that expectations for the
appreciation/depreciation of the effective exchange rate would be identi-
cal to those for the appreciation of the forint vis-à-vis the euro.
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In addition to global influences, country-specific
factors may also have played a role in this process
in Hungary. It cannot be ruled out that the
improvement in sentiment reflected a better
assessment of the country’s external equilibrium
position, which may have been fuelled by the
benign foreign trade data and the low level of
imports, in particular. This, however, introduces
uncertainty into the improvement in assessments
of country risk, as other economic indicators point
to higher imports relative to the official statistical
data (for more details, see Box 4-5).
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Per cent Per cent
Ex ante real 
interest rate
Contemporaneous real 
interest rate 
Chart 1-12
Real interest rate*
* Monthly averages of one-year government bond yields deflated by the cur-
rent 12-month inflation and Reuters’ one-year ex ante inflation consensus
(year-end values, derived from expectations for average inflation using inter-
polation). Expectations for December 2005 were calculated using Reuters’
inflation consensus (as at end-2006) on one-year yields (as at end-2005).

2. Inflation and its 
determining factors
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2.1. Economic activity
Due to sometimes contradictory data develop-
ments, both European and domestic economic
activity are surrounded by strong uncertainty.
There are no signs of a decline or even of a sharp
slowdown, and Hungary’s external markets and its
economy tend to suggest an upturn in the busi-
ness cycle. The volatility of certain developments,
however, increased significantly, rendering the
pace of growth rather uncertain.
Modest growth in external demand
At the end of 2004, growth in both GDP and
import-based external demand was slowing down
at Hungary’s most important foreign trading part-
ners. At first glance, external demand showed
signs of recovery in 2005 Q1, as GDP increased
by nearly 1 per cent in Germany and by 0.5 per
cent in the euro area, outperforming expectations.
It seems, however, that this jump in growth was
due to a significant drop in imports (imports fell by
1.4 per cent in Germany and by 1.6 per cent in the
euro area relative to Q4 of 2004), driven primarily
by an unexpected decline in domestic absorption
(especially investments) by Hungary’s foreign
trading partners.
Data on economic activity in Q2 suggest contin-
ued growth in Hungary’s export markets, although
they do not point clearly in one direction.
Industrial production, data on new orders and bu-
siness sentiment indices, which only improved at
the end of Q2 and only to a modest extent, indi-
cate a subdued growth outlook. Oil prices stuck
at a high level may also exercise downward pres-
sure on the cost side, although this is partly coun-
terbalanced by the weakening of the euro
exchange rate vis-à-vis the US dollar. Eurostat
has published an estimate of 0.3 per cent GDP
growth (month-on-month) for Q2 for the euro area,
with growth in Germany, which is Hungary’s
largest trading partner, stagnating. While an
increase in imports may provide a possible expla-
nation for this development, on the whole, it
seems that the growth rate of external demand
was subdued in Q2.
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
Per cent
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
Per cent
Export market size 
(left-hand scale)
GDP of main trading 
partners (right-hand scale)
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
2
01
 Q
3
01
 Q
4
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
2
02
 Q
3
02
 Q
4
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
2
03
 Q
3
03
 Q
4
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
2
04
 Q
3
04
 Q
4
05
 Q
1
Chart 2-1
Size of Hungary’s export markets* and GDP in its 
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Fluctuations in domestic output
Although industrial output is also expanding
(similarly to external demand), its rate of growth
fluctuates to a rather great extent. Following the
relatively high growth rates at end-2004 (gross
industrial output increased by 8 per cent and its
value added grew by 4.7 per cent in Q4 in annu-
alised terms), data for 2005 Q1 indicate a slow-
down (gross output remained almost flat and
value added declined slightly). In Q2, however,
growth in industrial output was outstanding
again, even in regional terms, despite a slight
drop in June.
Growth in industrial output was primarily driven by
an upturn in machinery and equipment with high
export sales, while the expansion of the chemical
industry also contributed to recent higher growth
rates to a modest extent.
Following the slowdown in Q1, new export orders
started to increase again which suggests that the
recovery in output in Q2 can be primarily attrib-
uted to improving opportunities for export sales.
Based on recent industrial output data, momen-
tum in domestic sales seems to be building up
(following a four-year stagnation). However, only
part of this upturn can be interpreted as an
increase in net terms according to CSO’s method-
ological notes.
1
Although – based on value added – manufacturing
output was weaker in 2005 Q1 (a 1.2 per cent
annualised decline), the recovery in gross output
in April and May is likely to be reflected in value
added in Q2 as well. In Q1, market services
(which have a greater weight in GDP) increased
by an annualised rate of 6.6 per cent, exceeding
expectations. The output of transport and telecom-
munications services (i.e. mainly also sub-sectors
reacting to external demand) continues to expand
to the greatest extent, while that of commercial
services linked to household consumption grew
only moderately.
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Monthly growth rate of industrial output trends 
and sectoral contributions to growth
* Data adjusted for seasonal and calendar effects. Sources: CSO for Hun-
gary (MNB adjustment) and Eurostat for other countries.
Sectors according to CSO sectoral codes: Food industry: DA; Light indus-
tries: DB-DE; Chemical industry: DF-DH; Commodity industry: DI-DJ;
Machinery and equipment: DK-DM; Energy: E
1
In its latest publication on industrial output the Central Statistical Office stated that part of the increase in turnover was due to energy-traders’ intra-
group activity. Since only gross sales are observed, the increase in turnover appears in an accumulated form, causing domestic sales to be biased
upwards.
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Construction expanded relatively significantly as
early as Q1 (based on value added it grew by 15.7
per cent in annualised terms) and the gross
monthly output data suggest that the sector will
continue to grow in Q2 as well. Due to the slow-
down in household investments and the growing
difficulties of smaller construction companies,
however, this momentum is mainly provided by
large government-financed infrastructure invest-
ments (above all motorway construction).
Slowdown in household consumption came to a halt 
In 2005 Q1, household consumption expenditures
increased by a rate of 2.6 per cent in annualised
terms, and this rate seems to have stabilized from
2004 H2. The recovery in retail trade turnover sug-
gests some growth in household consumption in
Q2 as well. Households, however, have been
increasing their financial savings as well and thus,
despite a more favourable income outlook, house-
hold consumption expenditures are growing at a
relatively modest rate.
Growing uncertainty regarding investments
Indices reflecting changes in the business cycle
relatively keenly (annual indices and trend time
series) attest to a continued expansion of overall
domestic gross fixed capital formation. Recently,
however, almost every new data point significant-
ly changed our assumption of the growth rate.
2
Based on available data on economic activity we
did not consider a significant recovery in early
2005 likely in our last Report. Manufacturing invest-
ments, however, exhibited annualised growth of
around 20 per cent in Q1, which still fell far short of
the 61 per cent annualised growth in overall
domestic gross fixed capital formation. As this lat-
ter growth was mainly driven by the transport and
the telecommunications sectors and as the origi-
nally government-financed motorway construction
is included in this part of the quarterly investments
statistics, we assume that the expansion in these
sectors contributed primarily to the outstanding
increase in gross fixed capital formation in Q1.
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Households’ consumption expenditure and retail trade
turnover* 
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
2
The growth rate in 2005 Q1 is nearly 13 per cent (i.e. exceeding 60 per cent annualised), pointing to a much sharper increase than suggested
by the last actual data available for 2004 Q4 which indicates a significant drop. This is the third successive quarter in which seasonal adjustment
has resulted in a significant revision. The adjusted time series also became noisier. In 2004, based on the CSO’s seasonally adjusted and balanced
data, double-digit percentage growth was followed by a double-digit percentage decline and vice versa quarter by quarter which means that the
noise in the time series is significant, and this increase is difficult to explain.
* Based on total retail sales, i.e. including motor vehicles and fuels.
There were no developments in the indices rele-
vant from the point of view of Q2 investments (e.g.
capacity utilisation) which would point to a robust
recovery of investments in the manufacturing
industry. Thus, unless government-financed invest-
ments continue to expand at the outstanding rate
witnessed in Q1, Q2 may prove to be a negative
correction again in overall gross fixed capital for-
mation, similarly to the case seen last year.
Manufacturing and commercial inventories both
declined slightly in 2005 Q1. Due to robust sales
in manufacturing seen already in Q2, we assume
that inventories of own production have continued
to fall while growing imports may counterbalance
the stock of purchased goods even at the prevail-
ing high sales volumes. Due to possible ‘over-
stocking’ in early 2004, commercial inventories are
likely to decline further.
Changing exports orientation, questions in the data
on imports
So far in 2005 goods exports have continued to
increase steadily. Growth in goods exports is
mainly driven by the machinery and equipment
sub-sectors and within these, the production of
communications technology consumer goods
(essentially meaning the production of mobile tele-
phones), which saw significant capacity expan-
sion. Vehicle production was also outstanding.
Although the growth rate of Hungary’s exports
continues to exceed that of its export markets, the
increase of our market share within the EU-15
countries clearly came to a halt in early 2005. This
was mainly due to the fact that since Hungary’s
accession to the EU in May 2004 the structure of
the country’s exports has started to change rela-
tively quickly: the share of exports to new EU
Member States grew significantly, primarily at the
expense of the share of old Members. One expla-
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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Exports of goods
(at current prices)
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
01
 Q
1
01
 Q
3
02
 Q
1
02
 Q
3
03
 Q
1
03
 Q
3
04
 Q
1
04
 Q
3
05
 Q
1
Per cent
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Per cent
Manufacturing Whole sale
and retail tradeTotal
Chart 2-8
Inventories
(change in end-of-quarter stocks at constant prices for total:
growth contribution for manufacturing and retail stocks)
* Time series excluding transitory effects. Data for June to be considered
preliminary.
Inflation and its determining factors
27
nation for this reshaping of export orientation
might be that EU-accession along with lifting cus-
toms frontiers might have deepened economic
integration mainly among new entrants.
Following the earlier period of stagnation, goods
imports also began to grow again in Q2. However,
such imports remained subdued in terms of levels
causing a significant improvement in the 2005 H1
trade balance compared to the previous year.
Some caution should be exercised in assessing
developments in imports because data are sur-
rounded by a high degree of uncertainty. External
balance and GDP data inconsistencies (see
Section 4.3) cast doubt on the interpretation of offi-
cial imports statistics because they point to higher
imports than shown in official import statistics.
Economic growth
In 2005 Q1, GDP grew by 2.9 per cent relative to
2004 Q1. If we filter out calendar effects, however,
the rate of expansion was higher, reaching 3.5 per
cent. On the production side, growth was fuelled
more by services than goods production sectors,
while on the expenditure side gross fixed capital
formation and net exports contributed most to the
increase.
If we correct GDP for the deterioration in the terms
of trade, we arrive at the indicator Gross Domestic
Income (GDI), which is more suited for assessing
changes in the external balance than GDP. Due to
the deteriorating terms of trade that marked all of
2004, this indicator has shown persistently slower
growth than GDP in recent periods and due to the
strengthening of the deterioration in terms of trade,
it fell significantly behind GDP growth in 2005 Q1
(growing by only 1.6 per cent relative to 2004 Q1).
Based on manufacturing activity on the production
side and consumption along with net exports on
the expenditure side, we expect slightly more
buoyant GDP growth in Q2. CSO’s research arm,
Ecostat published its flash estimate for Q2 on 15
August, expecting fairly strong, roughly 4 per cent
year-on-year GDP growth. Yet, the uncertainty
mentioned above with regard to import statistics
renders assessment of these data more difficult.
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Imports of goods
(at current prices)
* For 2004 we have made adjustments to the trend data series for import
purchases brought forward and for the public warehouse effect. The for-
mer adjustment meant deducting an amount of EUR 350 million from
growth in imports in March and April 2004, which was added to growth
during the rest of the year distributed evenly from May. Adjustment in the
latter case meant deducting a total amount of EUR 419 million from the
value of (the c.i.f. value) of imports during the period between May and
July 2004. The value of the public warehouse adjustment was taken out
from the data series for goods. Data for June to be considered preliminary.
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Gross Domestic Income (GDI)* and Gross Domestic
Product
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
* MNB estimate. Data on GDP are taken from the CSO’s seasonally adjust-
ed and balanced times series.
With the exception of Poland, the pace of growth
in the new EU entrants from Central and Eastern
Europe is declining. In the last two years
Hungary’s rate of economic growth in quarterly
terms was one of the lowest in the region.
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As we wrote in connection with foreign trade and external bal-
ance (see Section 4.3), last year’s changes in the data collec-
tion system may have resulted in lower import data for some
time. The question is whether net exports calculated in this
manner, which show a better picture than the underlying
developments, could also have an impact on GDP in addition
to the current account.
In principle, on the expenditure side of GDP, uncertainty in
the foreign trade data does not necessarily have an impact on
aggregate GDP because as it is taken into account on the pro-
duction side this will be indicated in the difference between
the two sides in the ‘statistical deviation’ line with opposite
signs. In practice, however, in the case of quarterly fre-
quencies in particular, the estimate on the production side is
even more uncertain than the one on the expenditure side.
Consequently, if low recorded import turnover is not accom-
panied by an identically low level of domestic absorption,
the downward distortion of imports may imply higher GDP.
Examining the recent developments in Hungary’s GDP, we
can conclude that while net exports have improved signifi-
cantly since mid-2004, the item ‘change in stocks and other,
not specified uses’ has become negative in a manner not hith-
erto fore experienced, and to a great extent. Hence, it is pos-
sible that the expenditure side, which increased suddenly as a
result of measured imports that were lower than could be
expected from underlying economic activity developments,
may thus be closer to the lower GDP growth rate measured on
the production side. This may suggest that the improvement in
net exports due to the lower level of recorded imports could
only have slightly increased GDP.
In summary, the above question marks increase the uncer-
tainties surrounding the assessment of GDP and thus this
year’s fact and forecast figures regarding GDP should be
treated with due caution.
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GDP growth in the region*
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
* Seasonally adjusted data. Source: Czech Republic, Slovakia: OECD,
Hungary: CSO, Poland: basic data from Eurostat, adjusted by the MNB.
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2.2. Labour market
In 2005 H1, the labour market was characterised
by moderate labour use, growing activity and
unemployment, and subdued wage growth. All of
this indicates that labour market tightness has
continued to ease since 2004 H2. At the same
time, however, the latest actual data suggest
growing uncertainty surrounding labour use,
unemployment and wage inflation.
Labour use continues to be moderate
The earlier recovery in labour use in the private
sector came to a halt in 2004 H2 and seems to
have remained flat since then. Based on total
hours worked (the main indicator of labour
use), this stagnation can be attributed to vari-
ous sectoral developments. Despite growing
economic activity in Q2, labour use in manu-
facturing is continuing to decline, while total
hours worked in the segment of market servic-
es is increasing.
Labour use in manufacturing has been continu-
ously declining since the end of 2000, despite the
upsurge in industrial activity witnessed since
2003. In contrast to this, labour use in the market
services sector has shown a smooth, dynamic
increase in line with the strong growth in the value
added of the sector, although since the beginning
of this year this growth has mainly been attribu-
table to the rise in labour intensity, as opposed to
an increase in employment.
Similar to developments in the private sector, whole-
economy employment (including employment in the
government sector as well) also showed signs of
stagnation in H1 2005. On the other hand, this gen-
eral stagnation may be slightly counterbalanced by
the increase in the number of recently announced
vacancies, which started at end-2004. Although the
number of new vacancies is still at the average level
for 2002, it cannot be ruled out that a permanent rise
may indicate a future turning point in the so far sub-
dued labour demand of corporations.
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Recently announced vacancies
3
The volatility of the series of recently announced vacancies has increased considerably since January 2004. It is unclear so far whether this
increase indeed reflects more volatile developments or a methodological change in the time series.
Growing activity, rising unemployment
In Q2, the number of unemployed continued to
rise, a process which started at the end of 2003.
The rate of unemployment is above 7 per cent
and, adjusted for seasonal effects, it still shows a
rising trend.
4
Based on recent developments it seems that in
addition to the stagnation of labour demand, a
growing labour supply (i.e. increased activity) may
have also contributed to the rise in unemployment.
Together, these two phenomena might be attrib-
uted to the decline in the participation rate and the
simultaneous rise in the rate of activity. The upturn
in labour supply despite subdued labour demand
remains difficult to explain.
5
Lower rate of wage growth in the private sector with
large fluctuations
Wage inflation in the private sector continued to
decline gradually in 2005 H2. On the one hand,
this phenomenon is in line with the easing of
labour market tightness, while on the other hand it
indicates that private sector companies are grad-
ually adjusting to a low price inflation environment.
Wage inflation fell in both manufacturing and mar-
ket services, although the slowdown in manufac-
turing (especially in machinery and equipment)
has been more significant since early 2005.
The rate of the slowdown of wage inflation, howev-
er, is surrounded by a rather high degree of uncer-
tainty. The main reason for this uncertainty is that in
2004 irregular payments (i.e. bonuses) were paid
at a time different from the usual period, and this
made the assessment of developments at the level
of annual indices more difficult in 2005 as well.
Wage inflation adjusted for the irregular seasonal
behaviour of bonus payments, however, is still on
the decline. Accordingly, and taking into account
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
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4
Although data for June in Q2 indicates a halt, we still consider this a temporary phenomenon, because of the noise of the time series.
5
Upon closer examination, the rise in labour market activity is primarily due to the fact that the willingness of inactive persons to look for jobs has
increased, resulting in the inclusion of a group of inactive persons in the active category. In demographic breakdown, this development is most
prevalent in the growing activity rate of women in the age group of 45-49 and in the activity of the age group of 20-24, which is declining to a small-
er extent than in the past few years. This phenomenon is consistent with the hypothesis according to which some inactive persons are attached to
the labour market nearly as closely as those with official unemployed status and this group could even be considered part of the whole-economy
labour force reserve.
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Economic activity, employment and unemployment
(seasonally adjusted)
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Private sector wage inflation*
(seasonally adjusted, annualised quarter-on-quarter
growth rates)
* Due to adjustment for bonus payments, the time series is determined by the
dynamics of regular payments. In 2004 and 2005, the adjustment for bonus-
es was undertaken according to our own estimate on bonus payments.
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stagnating labour demand and the long-term
decline in wage inflation expectations, we expect
wage inflation to remain moderate in 2005 H2.
Faster growth in unit labour costs is expected to be
temporary
Despite the decline in wage inflation, the rate of
growth in nominal unit labour costs in the private
sector – one of the most dominant cost-side fac-
tors of inflationary pressure – accelerated slightly
in 2005 Q1. This increase can be attributed to the
fact that the rate of wage inflation exceeded that of
productivity (wage inflation fell to a smaller extent).
These developments were mainly due to
unfavourable manufacturing productivity in Q1,
while market services were characterised by a
slight improvement in productivity, combined with
slower growth in unit labour costs.
According to available data for April and May,
however, it seems that the growth in the nominal
unit labour costs in the private sector was quite
short-lived. We expect that in Q2 the sharp rise in
private sector productivity combined with the con-
tinuing fall in wage inflation will lead to a decline in
unit labour costs.
In Q1, real unit labour costs in the private sector
(i.e. the index of nominal unit labour costs deflated
by producer prices) also increased. The slight
growth in real unit labour costs which started in
2004 H2 could indicate a fall in private sector
companies’ profitability, while at the same time it
seems temporary, as we expect that in Q2 the
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Wage inflation expectations and perceptions, 
MNB survey*
* Based on a corporate survey conducted by Tárki until 2005 Q1 and by
Medián afterwards.
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Nominal unit labour cost, productivity and wages in the
private sector
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates)
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Real effective exchange rate indices*
* Real appreciation is shown by a higher value. PPI: Producer Price In-
dex, ULC: Manufacturing Unit Labour Cost Index.
growing trend of real unit labour costs will come to
a halt in line with the slowdown of nominal unit
labour costs.
Despite the developments described above, the
ULC-based real effective exchange rate index
appreciated only slightly in Q1 due to the halt in
the appreciation of the nominal effective exchange
rate. The earlier appreciation trend of the producer
price-based real effective exchange rate also
seems to be coming to an end. On the whole, all
these signs are pointing to a favourable change in
the competitiveness of manufacturing companies
in foreign markets and, according to data on Q2,
this process is likely to continue further.
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2.3. Inflation developments
In 2005 Q2, the consumer price index (CPI) stood
at 3.8 per cent. This figure is 0.2 percentage
points higher than the Q1 index. The rise of infla-
tion in the last quarter was accompanied by a
decline in core inflation, meaning that the increase
in the price index is attributable to items falling
outside the scope of core inflation.
6
In the previous quarter, the difference between the
12-month moving average of the Hungarian HICP
measure and the value of the Maastricht price sta-
bility criterion continued to decrease.
7
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CPI and core inflation
(year-on-year indices)
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Hungarian HICP and the Maastricht criterion on price
stability*
Table 2-1
Main inflation indicators
(annual percentage changes)
2004 2005
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Core inflation 5.9 5.3 3.2 2.2
Unprocessed foods 11.9 1.5 -2.2 5.0
Vehicle fuel and market energy 7.6 10.0 6.4 8.7
Regulated prices 8.3 7.2 4.8 6.4
CPI 7.0 5.9 3.6 3.8
6
The CSO published the July 2005 CPI data after finalisation of our analysis. The data behind the 3.7 per cent rise in the CPI and the 1.6 rise in the
core inflation reinforce the picture outlined in our analysis.
7
Although in the previous quarter the rate of domestic inflation was somewhat higher than in Q1, the 12-month moving average decreased as the
indices of around 7 per cent in mid-2004 were replaced by indices of under 4 per cent.
* Based on the 12-monthly moving average of annual indices. Based on the
EU-25 from May 2004. We excluded Member States with a negative 12-
month average inflation rate, following the practice of the European
Central Bank applied in the 2004 Convergence Report.
Core inflation sinks to a low level
In 2005 Q2, the decline in the annual index of core
inflation which started in mid-2004 continued, as
confirmed by alternative indicators of underlying
inflation as well. Similarly to 2005 Q1, the quarter-
ly index of core inflation at the annual level was
around 1 per cent.
On the supply/cost side, core inflation declined
due to numerous factors: strong import competi-
tion driven by moderate price increases of import-
ed processed goods; the forint exchange rate,
which appreciated during 2004 and has remained
stable since then; elimination of most commercial
restrictions since EU accession; and the growing
number of competitors. Disinflation effects were
also felt from the demand side: over the last year
and a half the growth rate of household consump-
tion fell well behind that seen in previous years.
Inflation expectations also continued to decline.
Although the decline in core inflation and its per-
sistently low level cannot be associated with any
product group and, therefore, disinflation within the
core inflation group may be considered general, it
is still worth examining some of the processes in
more detail.
Similarly to the previous quarter, prices of tradables
also fell in Q2. It should be noted that within this
group prices of non-durables have also been
decreasing for the second consecutive quarter.
Disinflation was facilitated by the fact that the infla-
tion of tradables reached a historically low level in
the EU as well.
The positive effect of Hungary’s EU accession on
import competition can be clearly felt in processed
foods and alcoholic beverages. Following a
decline in 2005 Q1, prices of processed foods
remained basically flat in Q2, while the inflation of
alcoholic beverage prices continues to be much
lower than in the previous years, which may be
partly due to the fact that excise duties were not
raised in 2005.
Items of the consumer basket excluding core 
inflation increased inflation
In 2005 Q2, rising oil and raw food prices led to an
increase in the CPI despite the general disinflation
environment.
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Chart 2-22
Indicators of underlying inflation*
(year-on-year indices)
* 20 per cent was cut off the trimmed CPI on both sides. The Edgeworth
indicator was weighted with a 24-month backward-looking variance. Core
inflation is based on CSO publication; core inflation excluding tobacco is an
MNB estimate. See Box 2-1 of our May 2005 Report on underlying inflation
indicators.
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Vehicle fuel prices increased by 7 per cent quar-
ter-on-quarter in 2005 Q2, while oil prices (in euro
terms) grew by 13 per cent. According to the data,
rising vehicle fuel prices have not yet exerted gen-
eral inflationary pressures.
Prices of unprocessed foods rose by nearly 8 per
cent in one quarter. This increase, which consid-
erably exceeded our previous expectations, could
be attributed to the much higher-than-usual price
increases of seasonal foods in the period.
According to sector analysts, price rises were
caused by weak supply, which was not counter-
balanced even by imported goods. A close look at
the region reveals that the recent price increase
was characteristic only of Hungary, while in the
neighbouring countries prices of unprocessed
foods remained flat or the price increases were
much more modest.
The inflation of regulated prices grew signifi-
cantly, by nearly 1.5 per cent, in the previous
quarter. This, however, was due to the base
effect: the 12 per cent decrease in pharmaceuti-
cal prices in April 2004 was excluded from the
annual index.
Over the past few months, Hungarian unprocessed food prices
grew by more than 10 per cent, disregarding the normal sea-
sonality pattern. Compared to the other EU Member States in
the region, it can be stated that, apart from Hungary, a sig-
nificant price rise in this product group has only occurred in
Slovakia in the past few months, but here too the rise was
lower than seen in Hungary.
Looking further back, we also see that since 2001 Hungary
has experienced the largest increase in unprocessed food
prices in the region.
8
At the same time, however, the rea-
sons for this are not clear as the price level of the two
groups carrying the most weight within the product group
(meat and seasonal foods) is not lower in Hungary than in a
number of other EU Member States in the region. This
Box 2-2 Prices of unprocessed foods in the region
Chart 2-24
Prices of unprocessed foods in the region
(seasonally adjusted data)
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8
The comparison has been made since 2001 as this is the year from which comparable times series for each country have been available in the
Eurostat NewCronos database.
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Chart 2-25
Standard deviation of seasonally adjusted monthly
indices of unprocessed food prices*
(percent)
Inflation expectations continue to decline
Disinflation in the recent past has been accompa-
nied by a decline in perceived and expected infla-
tion among economic participants. In 2005 Q2,
households’ inflation ‘sentiment’ improved accord-
ing to an MNB survey and remained the same
according to a GKI survey.
Professional analysts adjusted their inflation projec-
tions for December 2006 downwards by nearly 1.5
per cent in June, which could mainly be due to the
government’s announcement of the planned reduc-
tion in indirect taxes. If we exclude those analysts
who, in all probability, did not take into account this
reduction in taxes at the time of the survey, the
decline in the average inflation value projected by
analysts for end-2006 is even more considerable.
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Perceived and expected inflation according to the MNB
survey*
* On the basis of a household survey commissioned by MNB and conducted
by Medián.
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Inflation forecasts of professional analysts in the Reuters
survey
means that the hypothesis of price convergence alone can-
not fully explain this process. It should also be noted that
the level of Hungarian prices of unprocessed foods is one of
the most volatile in the European Union. This may be
attributable to methodological differences in price statistics
or structural differences in the product markets of certain
countries (i.e. concerning regulations, the intensity of com-
petition).
9
9
For related methodological questions, see ’Harmonized indexes of consumer prices: their conceptual foundations’ by Erwin Diewert, ECB, Working
Paper No. 130, March 2002.
3. Inflation outlook
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Our current forecast presents a possible macro-
economic path which is much more uncertain than
usual. The reason for this uncertainty is that the
recently disclosed measures to be taken by the
government provide only partial information and
other elements of the 2006–2007 fiscal policy
remain unknown. As a result, we had to resort to
assumptions regarding their potential total effect.
While in the main scenario the measures disclosed
so far practically do not change the longer-term
inflation path, they significantly increase the risk
to stability. All this makes the main scenario very
fragile, as fiscal policy with a larger-than-
assumed easing or tightening demand effect
would involve different growth, inflation and equi-
librium paths, which, by influencing sustainability
expectations, would also affect developments in
monetary conditions.
Our main scenario projection is based on the
assumption that inflationary environment will remain
stable over the longer term. In our main scenario, a
strengthening of inflationary pressure is anticipated
on the demand side: household consumption and
GDP are expected to grow faster than earlier. On the
other hand, inflation in 2007 is expected to be tem-
pered by the labour cost reducing effect of other
measures planned to be taken by the government.
Thus, core inflation – following a temporary fall in
2006 – is expected to be slightly above 3 per cent in
2007, i.e. somewhat higher than now, while the con-
sumer price index is expected to be below 2 per
cent next year and around 3 per cent in 2007.
The change in our projection relative to May mainly results
from the recent increase in oil prices, which are expected to be
close to USD 60 in 2006 and 2007.
Our forecast takes account of the impact of the future measures
recently disclosed by the government (tax reduction pro-
gramme, expansion of the family support scheme, minimum
wage increase; see details in Section 4). These measures them-
selves entail significant fiscal demand easing, while the details of
further measures planned to counterbalance this are not yet
known. The implicit assumption underlying our macroeconom-
ic projection is that the government will offset the deficit-boost-
ing effect of the aforementioned measures in a partly contrac-
tionary manner through strict wage policy, increasing restric-
tions on investment spending and reducing the real value of
non-determined current expenditure. All in all, in our main sce-
nario – following the projected 1 percent expansion this year –
fiscal policy in 2006 and 2007 is expected to stimulate demand
by an aggregate impulse equalling 0.5–1 per cent of GDP.
Box 3-1 Our assumptions and the fragility of the main scenario
Table 3-1
Major assumptions determining the main scenario
2005 2006 2007
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 6.75 6.75 6.75
5-year yield (per cent)** 6.25 6.25 6.25
EUR/HUF exchange rate (forint)* 246.9 246.5 246.5
USD/EUR exchange rate (cent)* 124.5 120.5 120.5
Brent oil price (US dollar/barrel)* 54.1 59.5 58.0
* Annual average based on the projection of the July 2005 averages. ** Year-end figures.
A pick-up in business activity is anticipated
A steady increase in external demand and dynam-
ic growth in Hungary’s exports are expected for
the coming period. Despite the fact that the
expansion of Hungary’s export markets was below
the expected rate in 2005 Q1, a slow, but steady
increase in external demand over the longer term
is still assumed. The stagnation in domestic
absorption at Hungary’s trading partners remains
an important uncertainty factor in assuming exter-
nal demand, although there has been an improve-
ment in European business expectations recently,
which slightly brightens the picture.
The increase in Hungary’s exports in the first half of
the year significantly exceeded growth in external
markets. This is considered to be a partly tempo-
rary phenomenon, and export growth is expected
to return to its trend in the second part of the year.
In our assessment, growing export possibilities will
prompt companies to continuously expand their
capacities, and thus a steady increase in corpo-
rate investment is expected for the coming period.
However, broadly defined public investment, as
opposed to the usual cyclic character of the
process, is expected to increase only minimally in
2006 and then fall in 2007.
In the labour market the contrasting effects of the
announced government measures significantly
increase the uncertainty of the assessment of
future trends. On the whole, a temporary interrup-
tion to the declining wage inflation trend is expect-
ed. The underlying reason for this is the planned
differentiated rise in the minimum wage in 2006,
the direct effect of which is expected to be only
partly offset by the reduction in VAT. It is assumed
that in 2007, despite strengthening domestic busi-
ness activity, wage increases will slow down as a
consequence of moderate labour demand.
11
Whole-economy employment is projected to grow
slower than previously expected. In addition to the
presumed staff reduction in the public sector, this
projection is justified by the assumption that the
number of employees in the business sector will
decline slightly due to the rise in minimum wages.
As a result of these processes, following an
increase in 2004 and 2005, unemployment is
expected to stabilise at around 7 per cent, i.e. at a
higher-than-earlier level.
Amidst these conditions, in manufacturing the
ULC-based real exchange rate is expected to
weaken, which will initially be caused mainly by
dynamic productivity growth and then by the
assumed decline in incidental costs due to gov-
ernment measures.
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Chart 3-1
Investments by sectors*
10
* Individual sectors’ contribution to total investment.
10
It is important to emphasise that the distribution of investments between the corporate and public sectors after 2003 is very uncertain, as no pre-
cise data on the volume of motorway investment are available. The sectoral breakdown is released by the CSO with a delay of two years.
11
Neither an increase in labour supply, nor a spillover effect (wage compression) was taken into account when assessing the effect of the rise in
minimum wage.
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Following from the government measures dis-
closed to date – especially the VAT reduction and
the expansion of the family support scheme –
household real income is expected to increase,
which will result in growing consumption, savings
and fixed investment.
12
In our projection, the
increase in real income is expected to be reflect-
ed in household consumption in a subdued man-
ner. Increased cautionary savings is justified by
the persistently high level of unemployment. The
increase in real income exceeding consumption is
expected to result in a growth of household sav-
ings over the forecast period. Moreover, house-
hold investment may increase as well, and as
opposed to the preceding period, growth in this
field may also materialise in 2007.
Due to robust domestic demand, import demand
is expected to slow down less rapidly than export
growth, and thus net exports are projected to
worsen in 2006 (or to stagnate, if the effect of the
Gripen procurement is excluded). Nevertheless, a
slight improvement towards the end of the forecast
period is expected, which is related to the pre-
sumed decline in public investment.
In the main scenario, our business activity forecast
shows a higher-than-earlier growth rate, due to
increasing household consumption, which will fol-
low from the announced government measures.
Our GDP projection has moved upwards over the
forecast horizon; growth rates of around 4 per cent
are expected for 2006 and 2007, respectively.
Taking into account that in our estimations the so-
called potential growth rate of the economy deter-
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Contributions to GDP growth*
* Contribution of individual factors to annual GDP growth, percentage
points. The Chart also takes account of the settlement of the Gripen pro-
curement.
12 
In connection with the rise in minimum wage, no direct income effect has been assumed (see Section 4.5).
mined by the supply side capacities is in the mid-
dle of the 3–4 per cent band, in the coming period
a growth rate slightly above the level sustainable
in the longer run is projected, i.e. a gradual
increase in demand side inflationary pressure is
expected.
In the main scenario inflation is expected to be
around 3 per cent over the longer term
As a direct effect of the VAT reduction, the con-
sumer price index is expected to decline by 1.4
percentage points in 2006. Compared to the maxi-
mum 1.9 percentage point effect, this assumes a
partial pass-through (see Section 4.4). Towards
the end of the forecast period the indirect effects
of the VAT reduction, e.g. through the increase in
consumption demand, are expected to gradually
offset this price level reducing effect, thus boost-
ing inflationary pressure. 
It is assumed that imported inflation will continue
to contribute to the development of a low-infla-
tion environment. The effect of the low imported
inflation assumed to be stable over the forecast
period may be strengthened by a stable
exchange rate and continuing fierce market
competition. However, an increase in oil prices
may result in a mounting inflationary pressure. At
the same time, we are of the opinion that the
effect of external factors will gradually weaken,
and internal factors related to unit labour costs
may play an increasing role in developments in
inflation.
The expected favourable development of unit
labour costs will increasingly offset demand-side
inflationary pressure as time goes by. In 2006, the
labour cost increasing effect of the rise in the mi-
nimum wage is projected to be offset by the antic-
ipated dynamic growth in productivity and the
gradual reduction in the health care contribution.
In 2007, labour costs will further be lowered by the
planned 3 percentage point reduction in the social
security contribution and the final termination of
the health care contribution. Thus, assuming
favourable developments in wages and productiv-
ity, in 2007 unit labour costs are expected to
remain around the previous year’s level in nominal
terms as well.
Overall, we believe that the demand effect creat-
ed by the pick-up in consumption and the above-
trend economic path will only be slightly reflect-
ed in the consumer price index, due to the direct
effect of the VAT reduction in 2006 and the
decline in unit labour cost in 2007. Core inflation
is projected to temporarily but significantly slow
in 2006, and then to fluctuate at around 3 per
cent in 2007, provided that the excise duty is
raised as usual. Taking into account our assump-
tions for other items, the projected average
increase in the consumer price index will be
somewhat below 2 per cent in 2006 and near 3
per cent in 2007.
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Chart 3-5
Trend inflation developments in the main scenario*
(annualised quarter-on-quarter growth rates, per cent)
* Weighted index created from four items (processed food, industrial
goods, market services, alcoholic beverages and tobacco products) by the
MNB for the purpose of analysis and forecasting, to estimate the core infla-
tion index. For technical reasons, this indicator may, in the short term, be
different from the core inflation index published by the CSO. Over the
longer term, however, both follow identical trends. For 2006 Q1 and 2007
Q1 the usual increase in the excise duty of tobacco and alcohol is assumed
(this adds an annual 0.2–0.3 percentage points to core inflation).
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The uncertainty of the forecast has increased
In order to quantify the effects of the many gov-
ernment measures announced, several assump-
tions were made, which substantially increased
the uncertainty of our forecast relative to the previ-
ous period. The incomplete character of the state-
ments made by the government, which means that
it is not yet known how the negative impact of the
planned measures on the fiscal balance will be off-
set, renders our main scenario extremely fragile.
However, this impact cannot be quantified.
The magnitude of the direct effect of the VAT
reduction – an important factor of projection uncer-
tainty – basically depends on product market char-
acteristics, i.e. the strength of competition,
demand elasticity for a given product and price
transparency. When assessing the longer-term
effects of the VAT reduction, other risk factors also
arise. The most notable one is the uncertainty sur-
rounding pass-through of the VAT reduction. Due
to the increasing demand, this uncertainty is con-
sidered to represent an upside risk from the aspect
of inflation. On the other hand, however, it would
result in a lower-than-projected inflation path if, in
contrast to our basic assumption, the VAT reduc-
tion was embedded in inflation expectations or
labour supply reacted to the increase in consumer
real wages more flexibly than supposed.
The rise in the minimum wage is not expected to
result in a direct income-increasing effect, and
neither a substantial wage compression effect, nor
a positive labour supply reaction is projected as
far as longer-term effects are concerned. These
assumptions significantly increase the uncertainty
of our projections.
The uncertainties surrounding regulated prices,
unprocessed food prices and the price of oil are
also significant, although the concrete trends for
2007 are not clear.
Overall, on the time horizon relevant from a mone-
tary policy aspect, the uncertainty surrounding our
inflation projection is comparatively balanced in
2007 around the main scenario.
In addition to the projection uncertainty appearing
in the fan chart, there is also a significant sustain-
ability risk, as the planned government measures
themselves involve an effect which increases the
government deficit significantly. It is uncertain how
and to what extent this effect will be counterbal-
anced by the 2006 and 2007 budgets. It is
assumed in our projection in an implicit manner
that although future fiscal steps will partly offset the
demand increasing effect of the planned measures
and of the already known other determinants, the
budget, on the whole, will stimulate demand.
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Chart 3-6
Inflation fan chart*
(percentage changes on a year earlier)
* The fan chart represents the uncertainty around the central projection.
Overall, the coloured area represents a 90 per cent probability. The central,
darkest area containing the central projection for the consumer price index
illustrated by the white dotted line (as the mode of distribution) refers to 30
per cent of the probability. The year-end points and the continuous, hori-
zontal line from 2007 show the value of the announced inflation targets.
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4.1. Background information on the projections
Macroeconomic information disclosed since the
publication of the May Report has substantially
influenced our projection for consumer price infla-
tion for the entire forecast period. While for this
year mainly the higher-than-expected price
increase of items outside core inflation resulted in
a higher projection, the main underlying reason for
changing our inflation projection for 2006 is the
effect of the VAT reduction planned by the gov-
ernment.
In our current forecast, the projection for econom-
ic growth has gone through a substantial upward
Based on information that has become available since the pub-
lication of the previous Report, decisions made by the govern-
ment markedly influence the future course of inflation and
economic growth over the entire forecast horizon.
13
The planned 5 percentage point reduction in the 25 per cent
VAT rate results in important inflationary and real economy
effects for 2006. Depending on the adjustment by the corpo-
rate sector, the officially announced VAT reduction resulted
in a lower CPI projection for next year, while indirect effects
are anticipated to contribute to a somewhat higher inflation
and growth in 2007. In parallel with this, increasing house-
hold real incomes justify stronger-than-earlier growth in
household consumption, which will accordingly be coupled
with an upswing in economic growth over our entire forecast
horizon (for more details, see Section 4.4).
The differentiated rise in the minimum wage justifies a faster
increase in consumer prices from the supply side. Growing mi-
nimum wages result in increasing labour costs for the corpo-
rate sector (see details in Section 4.5).
Through the decline in labour costs, the reduction in 2007 of
the social security contribution paid by employers and the ter-
mination of the lump-sum health contribution may partly
compensate for the aforementioned secondary, positive infla-
tionary effects deriving typically from the increase in con-
sumption demand.
In 2006, additional household income will be generated by the
announced modifications of the family support scheme as well.
Although the scope of family tax benefits will become much
narrower, the amount of the family allowance will almost dou-
ble at the same time. Since this latter effect significantly over-
compensates the termination of tax benefits, this modification
may substantially contribute to the increase in household
income and consumption demand.
Overall, the announced measures by themselves involve fiscal
easing and an increase in the deficit. Although it is assumed that
part of this will be offset by the fiscal policy in a demand-reduc-
ing manner, the fiscal path implicitly underlying our macroeco-
nomic projection is still laxer compared to the May projection.
Box 4-1 The effect of certain recently announced measures to be taken by
the government on our forecast
13
With respect to the announced government decisions, we have taken into account that information which was published officially in the webpage
http://www.magyarorszag.hu/100lepes [in Hungarian only].
modification. GDP growth, which is stronger than
published in the May Report, is mainly deter-
mined by the fiscal measures announced by the
government (tax reduction, increasing support to
families). These measures will contribute to con-
siderable growth in household income through
several channels, resulting in a higher consump-
tion path.
Magyar Nemzeti Bank
48
Pursuant to the agreement concluded with Sweden in 2001
(and amended in 2003) Hungary is to purchase 14 Gripen
fighter planes in 2006 and 2007. As was emphasised in our
previous Report, in the GDP and current account statistics
based on accrual accounting and in the ESA deficit of general
government the total expenditure will have to be shown upon
the planes’ physical delivery, although the Hungarian state
will pay the acquisition costs of the planes in equal instalments
between 2002 and 2016.
14
A similar accounting methodology
was followed in 1993 as well, when 28 MIG-29 aircraft were
purchased in the framework of the financial settlement of ear-
lier Russian government debts to Hungary.
Pursuant to this accounting methodology, the procurement of
the fighters during 2006 and 2007 will have a significant one-
off effect on developments in certain components of GDP and
the current account deficit. In each of these two years the
value of the aircraft supplied is estimated to be around 0.5 per
cent of GDP, thus the value of public consumption will grow
accordingly, while net exports – as a result of the increase in
imports – are expected to worsen accordingly. Overall, accru-
al accounting of the aircraft does not result in any change in
our GDP projection. At the same time, in each of these two
years the current account deficit will increase by 0.5 per cent
of GDP.
Box 4-2 The effect of the Gripen fighter plane procurement on 
our forecast
Table 4-1
Effect of the Gripen Agreement on the 2006–2007 forecast
In our forecast: Memo:
taking the Gripen excluding the Gripen
procurements into account procurements
2006 2007 2006 2007
Public consumption 6.5 0.4 1.4 0.4
Domestic absorption 5.7 2.7 5.2 2.7
Imports 10.6 7.9 9.8 7.9
GDP 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.8
Current account deficit (as percentage of GDP) 8.6 7.6 8.0 7.1
14
See details of the macrostatistical recording of the Gripen Agreement in Section 4.9 of the May 2005 Quarterly Report on Inflation.
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Table 4-2
Changes in the central projections relative to May 
(percentage changes on a year earlier unless otherwise indicated)
2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual/estimate Projection
May Current May Current Current
Inflation (annual average)
Core inflation
1
5.8 2.4 2.2 3.3 1.1 3.2
Consumer price index (CPI) 6.8 3.3 3.6 3.4 1.6 2.9
Economic growth
External demand (GDP-based) 1.9 1.5 1.6 2.2 2.0 2.0
Fiscal demand effect
2
-0.5 0.1 0.8 n/a 0.5-1.0* (-0.5)-0.0*
Household consumption 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.8 3.5 3.0
Memo: Household consumption expenditure 3.1 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.8 3.5
Gross fixed capital formation 7.9 4.5 5.4 5.2 4.9 2.1
Domestic absorption 2.2 3.1 1.2 3.4 5.7**** 2.7****
Exports 14.9 8.5 11.1 9.6 8.8 9.2
Imports 11.6 7.7 8.0 9.0 10.6**** 7.9****
GDP 4.0 (4.2)** 3.5 (3.3)** 3.6 (3.4) ** 3.6 3.9**** 3.8****
Current account deficit
As a percentage of GDP 8.9 8.6 7.6*** 8.2 8.6**** 7.6****
EUR billions 7.1 7.5 6.7*** 7.6 8.0**** 7.6****
External financing requirement
As a percentage of GDP 8.4 8.0 6.9*** 7.4 7.8**** 6.8****
Labour market
National economy gross earnings
3
6.1 8.4 8.2 6.3 6.5 5.4
National economy employment
4
-0.5 -0.5 -0.3 0.5 0.1 0.6
Private sector gross average earnings 9.3 7.0 6.8 6.6 7.2 5.6
Private sector employment
4
-0.3 -0.1 0.2 0.8 0.4 1.0
Private sector unit labour cost 3.1 2.9 2.9 1.8 2.1 0.2
Household real income 4.0***** 3.4 3.7 2.7 4.6 2.1
1
For technical reasons, our projected indicator may, in the short term, be different from the index published by the CSO. Over the longer term, however,
both follow identical trends.The cause of this technical discrepancy is that core inflation calculated by CSO cannot accurately be reproduced from the avail-
able group of CPI data, since the CSO breaks down several groups into core inflation items and sub-itemss excluded from such (e.g. pharmaceuticals).
2 
Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) type indicator; a negative value means a narrowing of aggregate demand. 
3
13th-month salaries carried
over from 2004 to January 2005 in the public sector cause a downward bias of the 2004 wage growth indicator and an upward bias of that in 2005. 
4
According
to CSO labour force survey. 
* Assumption for the fiscal impulse inherently consistent with the macroeconomic path; due to the lack of a draft bill on the 2006-07 budget, we cannot pro-
vide a detailed fiscal projection ** Due to the leap-year, GDP growth excluding calendar effects, which characterises business cycle trends better, may have
been about 0.2 per cent lower in 2004 and 0.2 per cent higher in 2005. *** The uncertainty in trade statistics (see section 4. 3) may imply a higher current
account deficit / external financing requirement by near 1 percent of GDP for 2005. **** Our projection allows for the adverse impact of the procurement of
Gripen planes on the current account and its contribution to an increase in public consumption and imports. *****MNB estimate.
Annual consumer price inflation stood at 3.8 per
cent in 2005 Q2, which is about 0.3 percentage
point higher than our previously published short-
term projection. The fact that the actual figure
slightly exceeds our projection is a result of a high-
er-than-expected price increase in certain prod-
ucts which are not included in the scope of core
inflation (motor fuel, seasonal products), while core
inflation was somewhat below our expectations. As
we have considered the inflation shock observed in
case of products excluded from core inflation to be
a persistent one, partly as a result of developments
in world market prices (motor fuel) and partly as a
result of the domestic supply and demand struc-
ture (unprocessed food), influenced by actual
data, our price projection for these items has been
modified upwards, i.e. towards higher inflation.
Changes in the EUR/HUF exchange rate, which
constitute one of our major assumptions, have not
had any important effect on our projection this
time. However, as mentioned when evaluating the
actual figure, the effects on inflation of the upward
trend in the futures oil price path are rather sub-
stantial. As the US dollar has also appreciated
recently, the increase in oil prices in the world
market influences forint prices in an amplified
manner. As oil prices are expected to remain per-
sistently high, our projection reckons with increas-
ing cost-push inflation both over the short and long
run.
Our projection for the 2006 consumer price infla-
tion has mainly been moderated by the technical
effects of the VAT reduction. The expected
upswing in economic activity will follow from a
dynamic growth in domestic demand, which will
mainly materialise in the household sector’s
stronger consumption demand, as a conse-
quence of dynamically increasing incomes.
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Table 4-3
Changes in the major assumptions relative to May*
May 2005 Current projection Change (percentage)
projection
2005 2006 2005 2006 2007 2005 2006
Central bank base rate (per cent)** 7.5 7.5 6.75 6.75 6.75 -0.75*** -0.75***
5-year yield (per cent)** 7.0 7.0 6.25 6.25 6.25 -0.75*** -0.75***
EUR/HUF exchange rate 247.4 248.2 246.9 246.5 246.5 -0.2 -0.7
EUR/USD exchange rate (cent) 129.9 129.5 124.5 120.5 120.5 -4.1 -6.9
Brent oil price (USD/barrel) 52.6 52.6 54.1 59.5 58.0 2.9 13.1
Brent oil price (HUF/barrel) 10,028 10,087 10,788 12,181 11,880 7.6 20.8
* Annual averages. Based on 2005 average exchange rates and futures oil prices. 
** Year-end figures. 
*** Difference, percentage points.
Special topics
51
The latest data released by the CSO are based on a general
data revision with retroactive effect as from 2003. The 2003
annual GDP index was revised 0.1 percentage point down-
ward, while that of 2004 0.2 percentage points up. Household
consumption expenditure and gross fixed capital formation
for both 2003 and 2004 also underwent a downward revision,
while the decline in imports exceeded that of exports in 2004.
Thus, the data revision resulted in a decline in domestic
absorption in 2004, while the contribution of net exports to
GDP growth increased.
Box 4-3 Impact of data revisions
Table 4-4
Changes in the main components of GDP use and the 2005 Q1 volume indices
(changes relative to previous year)
March publication of data June publication of data
2003 2004 2003 2004
Household consumption expenditure 8.1 3.5 7.8 3.1
Public consumption 5.4 -2.1 6.5 -3.9
Gross fixed capital formation 3.4 8.3 2.5 7.9
Domestic absorption 5.4 3.3 5.7 2.2
Exports 7.6 15.7 7.8 14.9
Imports 10.4 14.0 11.0 11.6
GDP 3.0 4.0 2.9 4.2
4.1.1. Impact of an alternative 
interest rate and exchange rate
assumption on our projection
In line with our earlier practice we present what
impact it would have on our projection if we used
the expected path drawn by the Reuters analysts’
survey, instead of our interest rate and exchange
rate assumptions.
We assumed that the central bank base rate will
remain at 6.75% over the entire forecast period. By
contrast, Reuters analysts expect a gradual
decline in the central bank’s base rate level, which
resulted in an interest rate path 1 percentage point
lower than assumed by us by the end of 2006. The
underlying assumption is that over the entire fore-
cast period the exchange rate will remain at the
average rate of last month’s (July) trading days,
which was HUF 246.5 per EUR in the current
Report. The average of professional analysts’
exchange rate expectations shows a more depre-
ciated path (the difference at end-2006 is more
than 2.5 per cent).
The interest rate and exchange rate paths expect-
ed by Reuters analysts would, relative to our cen-
tral projection, result in an inflation projection 0.1
percentage point, 0.3 percentage points and 0.2
percentage points higher at end-2005, end-2006
and end-2007, respectively. Provided that the
alternative interest rate and exchange rate
assumptions hold true, our projection for GDP
growth in 2006 and 2007 would temporarily
increase by 0.1 percentage point.
4.1.2. A comparison of our 
projections with those of other 
institutions
Our projections for the developments in inflation
and economic activity in 2005 are broadly identi-
cal with other analysts’ opinion. However, there
are substantial differences in the trends anticipat-
ed for 2006. In terms of both the prospective
developments in consumer prices and the magni-
tude of economic growth, our projections are mo-
re optimistic than those of the majority of analysts.
The underlying reason for this divergence may
partly be the difference between the basic
assumptions applied and partly the different
judgement of the effects of the announced gov-
ernment measures.
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Chart 4-1
Central bank base rate path based on the July Reuters
survey and the assumption with a constant interest rate
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Chart 4-2
Exchange rate based on the July Reuters survey and the
assumption of a constant exchange rate*
* Reverse scale.
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2005 2006 2007
Consumer price index (average annual increase, per cent)
MNB 3.6 1.6 2.9
Consensus Economics (July 2005)
1
3.6 – 3.7 – 3.9 1.8 – 2.6 (2.3)** – 3.5 n/a
European Commission (spring 2005) 3.8 3.6 n/a
IMF (April 2005) 4.0 3.8 n/a
Reuters survey (July 2005)
1
3.4 – 3.7 – 3.8 1.3 – 2.3 (2.0)**– 3.5 n/a
World Bank (July 2005) 3.8 n/a n/a
GDP (annual growth, per cent)
MNB 3.6*** 3.9 3.8
Consensus Economics (July 2005)
1
3.1 – 3.4 – 3.7 3.2 – 3.6 – 4.0 n/a
European Commission (spring 2005) 3.9 3.8 n/a
IMF (April 2005) 3.7 3.8 n/a
Reuters survey (July 2005)
1
3.4– 3.5 – 3.6 3.4 – 3.7 – 4.1 n/a
World Bank (July 2005) 3.5 n/a n/a
Current account deficit (in EUR billions)
MNB 6.7* 8.0**** 7.6****
Consensus Economics (July 2005)
1, 2
6.4 – 7.1 – 8.1 6.6 – 7.6 – 8.6 n/a
Reuters survey (July 2005)
1
6.6 – 7.0 – 7.2 6.8 – 7.1 – 8.0 n/a
Current account deficit (as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 7.6* 8.6**** 7.6****
European Commission (spring 2005) 8.7 8.2 n/a
IMF (April 2005) 8.6 8.1 n/a
World Bank (July 2005) 8.7 n/a n/a
General government deficit (according to ESA-95, as a percentage of GDP)
MNB 4.6 – 6.0***** n/a n/a
Consensus Economics (July 2005)
1
4.0 – 4.7 – 5.6 3.8 – 4.7 – 6.0 n/a
European Commission (spring 2005)
4
5.0 5.2 n/a
Reuters survey (July 2005)
1
5.0 – 5.1 – 5.4 4.5 – 4.8 – 5.0 n/a
World Bank (July 2005) 4.0 n/a n/a
Projections on the size of Hungary’s export market
MNB 4.0 5.7 5.0
European Commission (spring 2005)
3
6.2 6.3 n/a
IMF (April 2005)
3
6.4 6.9 n/a
Projections on the GDP growth rate of Hungary’s trading partners
MNB 1.6 2.0 2.0
European Commission (spring 2005)
3
1.6 2.1 n/a
IMF (April 2005)
3
1.6 2.2 n/a
Table 4-5
The MNB’s main scenario versus other projections
MNB projections are so-called ‘conditional’ projections. Therefore, they cannot always be directly compared to other projections. 
* The uncertainty in trade statistics (see section 4. 3) may imply a higher current account deficit by nearly 1 percent of GDP for 2005. ** The consensus in
parentheses has been calculated excluding the analysts who do not take account of the tax effect. *** Excluding leap-year effect. **** Our projection takes
account of the approximately 0.5 per cent GDP-proportionate negative effect on the current account resulting from the Gripen procurement. ***** The band
indicates the uncertainty of the application of the ESA methodology in Hungary. 
1
In addition to the averages of polled analysts’ responses (the values in the middle), the smallest and largest values are also indicated in italics for the
Reuters and Consensus Economics surveys in order to illustrate dispersion. 
2
Consensus Economics Inc. (London) ‘Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts’
specifies current account projections in US dollars, therefore they are converted at the EUR/USD exchange rate assumed in the current Report. 
3
Values
calculated by the MNB; the projections of the named institutions regarding individual countries are considered with the weights used for calculating the
MNB’s own external demand indicators. This way, the forecast may differ from the numbers published by the aforesaid institutions. 
4
For the sake of com-
parability the projection of the European Commission was corrected taking into account payments to the private pension fund system. Source: Consensus
Economics Inc. (London) Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts (July 2005); European Commission Economic Forecasts, spring 2005; IMF World
Economic Outlook (April 2005); Reuters survey, July 2005; World Bank EU-8 Quarterly Economic Report (July 2005).
Fiscal expansion in 2005 against a possibly lower
ESA deficit
Whereas in our central projection, the 2005 ESA and
GFS deficits will drop in comparison to 2004, the so-
called augmented (SNA) deficit, our estimate of the
general government balance taken in a broad
sense, indicates an increase in 2005: from 8.0 per
cent of GDP projected in the May 2005 issue of the
Report, it has risen to 9.1 per cent. The primary rea-
son for the opposite changes in the various indica-
tors is that a considerable part of the costs of motor-
way construction have been removed from the GFS
and ESA deficits, and in our analytical framework,
cash flows originating from the sales of motorway
sections and similar transactions are not considered
as deficit reducing revenues, i.e. those from the pri-
vate sector with a fiscal tightening impact.
Overall, the fiscal demand impact indicator sug-
gests a significant fiscal expansion for 2005 (in our
4.2. Developments in general government deficit indicators
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Chart 4-3
Fiscal demand impact, 1996–2005 
(as a percentage of GDP)
Actual/Estimate Projection
2002 2003 2004 2005
1) GFS balance -10.1 -6.0 -6.4 -5.3
2) Adjustment of the interest balance 0.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.3
according to ESA
3) Other corrections on ESA basis +0.9 -1.2 (+1.2)-(+0.6) (+1.0)-(-0.4)
4) ESA balance (1+2+3) -9.2 -7.2 (-5.4)-(-6.0) (-4.6)-(-6.0)
5) Balance according to national definition* -8.5 -6.3 (-4.4)-(-5.0) (-3.5)-(-4.9)
6) Quasi-fiscal expenditure and other adjustments +1.3 -2.6 -1.6 -3.8
7) Augmented (SNA) balance ** (1+6) -8.8 -8.6 -8.0 -9.1
8) Augmented (SNA) primary balance -5.0 -4.7 -4.2 -5.1
9) Fiscal demand impact *** +4.3 -0.5 -0.5 +0.8
Table 4-6
Fiscal indicators in our baseline scenario
As a percentage of GDP
* ESA deficit after adjustment for payments from and into private pension funds. ** Cash-based deficit of the general government excluding certain
extraordinary income and expenditure, and including the income from quasi-fiscal activities recorded outside the general government. As a result of a
recent revision of GDP data, these times series slightly differ from the earlier published ones. *** Calculated from the so-called augmented (SNA) indi-
cator; negative values denote contraction in aggregate demand.
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estimate amounting to 0.8 per cent of GDP), thus
irrespective of the 2005 developments in the ESA
deficit, this year the broad general government
sector has borrowed more funds for the purposes
of financing its deficit than in 2004.
The difference between developments in the GFS
or ESA and the augmented fiscal indicators also
reveals that the expected 2005 improvement in the
ESA balance is due primarily to the statistical
recording of revenues which do not imply a per-
manent improvement in the fiscal position. This
increases the risks to sustainability and the fiscal
targets set for the next few years.
Achievement of the 2005 target deficit carries 
considerable risk
As the methodology of applying the European Union’s
ESA deficit category in Hungary is not yet clear, the
ESA deficit can be projected only in the form of a
broad interval. Assuming that the government’s sub-
sequent balance-improving measures announced in
June and July 2005 are actually implemented, the
ESA deficit remains in the (-4.6)–(-6.0) deficit interval
we have projected, and thus the 4.7 deficit target can
be achieved, although at considerable risk.
15
Similarly to our earlier practice, for the purposes of
our central projection on the cash-based (GFS) defi-
cit, we have made several important assumptions.
• Disregarding open-ended expenditures, for the
primary expenditure we assume that the expendi-
ture estimates published by the Ministry of
Finance in mid-July 2005 will materialise.
• Regarding the earlier earmarked expenditure
reserve, the final freezing of HUF 125 billion of the
reserve, announced in early summer, has been
taken into account.
• For the purposes of our central projection, the in-
terest balance has been considered on the basis
of the forward yield curve published on 8 August
2005.
• The Hungarian Government informed the
European Commission of government measures
taken in order to improve the balance.
16
Sub-
sequently, the European Commission published
its analysis of the Hungarian fiscal position, giving
details of the measures envisaged by the
Hungarian Government. With a single exception,
the effects of the measures reported to the
European Commission have been incorporated in
our central projection. The exception is that our
projection disregards the impact of the govern-
ment measure taken in order to increase the carry-
over funds of budgetary units and institutions
(carry-over funds must be increased by HUF 50
billion in 2005).
17
If these assumptions are realised, the cash-based
(GFS) balance may drop from 6.4 per cent to 5.3
per cent, provided that in H2 the government will
be able to control budgetary expenditures more
stringently than before.
Some of the risks related to revenues and per-
ceived in May 2005 have been incorporated in our
current central projection. As the – partly paid –
additional revenues earned on the sale of govern-
ment properties offset most of this loss, they are
15
Reliable information will be available on this issue no earlier than March 2006, when Eurostat will publish the preliminary ESA deficit established
within the framework of the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
16
On 13 July 2005, the European Commission published its analysis of the Hungarian fiscal position within the framework of the excessive deficit
procedure launched against Hungary. The European Commission’s analysis has been made in view of the additional adjustment measures set forth
by the Government.
17
With a view to the accumulated tension perceived in relation to the expenditures of budgetary units and institutions, in our judgment, the govern-
ment measure of increasing the so-called carry-over funds can be executed only under favourable fiscal and economic conditions in 2005 H2. The
growth in such expenditures in 2005 H1 suggests that the performance of statutory responsibilities specified in the Budget Act may require more
funds than the amount available for the budgetary units after freezing.
considered in the central projection.
18
Currently,
risks towards lower revenues are seen primarily in
income taxes. While our projection on the net VAT-
payments has dropped by nearly 0.4 per cent of
GDP in comparison to the previous Report prima-
rily as a result of a poor cash-based performance
in Q2, positive risk is involved in the fact that if dur-
ing the rest of the year the rate of increase in tax
payments remains as high as in July, the addition-
al revenues generated this way may approach 0.4
per cent of GDP.
In respect of expenditures, significant risks are
perceived relative to the estimate specified in the
Budget Act (see Box 4-4 below).
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The Ministry of Finance expects the amount of 2005 expendi-
tures of central budgetary units and institutions around HUF
2,230 billion. Our projection on primary expenditures corre-
sponds to the Ministry of Finance’s forecast, as we acknowl-
edge that they have more information and possibilities to
intervene in the expected expenditure-related developments.
However, on the basis of 2005 H1 actual data, attention must
be called to the risks related to the achievability of this pro-
jection; specified as 0.4 per cent of GDP in this Report.
Up to 2002, the ratio of budgetary units’ net expenditures to
GDP gradually increased, followed by a decline during
2003–2004. However, in the meantime carry-over funds,
which jeopardise the achievement of the target deficit in the
next few years, have increased extremely fast. Using the rela-
tively restricted instruments available in the current structure
of government and public institutions (including zero-base
planning, the rearrangement of expenditures in the course of
the year, freezing, curtailment and the specification of the
required year-end minimum carry-over funds etc.), the
Ministry of Finance endeavours to prevent budgetary units
and institutions from using their funds carried over from pre-
vious years, in other words, to keep the overall net expendi-
ture at or below the budgetary estimate for the current year.
Every month in 2005 H1, net expenditures by budgetary units
and institutions exceeded the corresponding figure (adjusted
for motorway construction expenditures, as in 2005 these
have been removed from the general government budget) on a
year earlier. The total amount of 2005 H1 excess is HUF 194
billion. The deficit projected by the Ministry of Finance can
be achieved only if the net expenditure is at least HUF 116 bil-
lion less in 2005 H2 than in the same period a year earlier,
when expenditures were considered so high that cuts were seen
as a crucial requirement.
One factor preventing the required substantial reduction in the
expenditure is that wages, public utility bills, national contri-
bution to EU funds and the performance of other high-priori-
ty responsibilities, which amount to 80–85 per cent of the total
amount of payment liabilities, cannot or can only be deferred
within confines. Even if in 2005 H2 these expenditures are kept
at the average recorded between February and June 2005,
19
in
order to achieve the target, no more than 20 per cent of the
average amount spent between February and June 2005 could
be used for the purposes of other kinds of expenditure, prima-
rily capital investments. (For comparison: in 2004 and 2003,
the H2 investment spending was 106 and 150 per cent of the
February-June average, respectively.) 
Despite the fact that the target is exceeded every month, the pos-
sibility that 2005 expenditures can be temporarily reduced by
one-off measures and defering payments to 2006 may not be
ruled out. However, such contingent measures can reduce only
the cash-based (GFS) and the ESA-95 deficit, and despite possi-
bly deferred payments, expenditures will raise 2005 demand.
Box 4-4 Risks involved in projecting the expenditures of budgetary units
and institutions
18
The reason why the GFS deficit is lower than projected in May is technical: a planned debt assumption has not been performed within the gen-
eral government.
19
The average is exclusive of the exceptionally high January 2005 data.
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Higher risks to achieving the targeted 2006–2007 
deficit cuts
As there is no detailed draft budget bill, no point
estimate has been made for the 2006 and 2007
GFS and ESA deficits. In order for the govern-
ment to cut the deficit by the targeted annual
0.6% of GDP, significant measures will have to
be taken.
The following table contains quantified data for the
determinants and risks resulting from the discre-
tionary measures announced so far or non-discre-
tionary developments. We wish to stress that only
those effects can be quantified which result from
actually adopted earlier decisions (such as the
thirteenth-month pension) or official announce-
ments (e.g. tax cut programme and the extension
of family support schemes).
Our calculations rely on the following conditions
and information:
• For the purposes of quantifying the effects of the
announced tax cuts, we have relied on the meas-
ures described in the informative document
‘Thirteen steps of a 5-year tax cut programme’,
published by the Government Spokesman’s Office
(income tax, VAT, corporate taxes, tax on busi-
ness activity, lump sum health care and social
insurance contribution).
• In the May 2005 Report we expected the com-
plete abolition of the lump sum health care contri-
bution as of January 2006, thus the estimated rev-
enue shortfall in this tax category was raised by
0.3 per cent of GDP.
• Changes to the family benefit scheme were
announced in the framework of the 100 steps pro-
gramme and no independent estimate was made
of their impact. It is assumed that in 2007 the fam-
ily allowance will not be valorised.
• The effects of new measures taken to increase
tax revenues have been calculated on the basis of
data published by the Prime Minister’s Office
(extension of the contribution base and assess-
ment of luxury tax).
• Regarding one-off revenue losses, the effects of
losses resulting from the termination of revenues
earned on sales of motorways and the abolition, as
of 2007, of the special corporate tax levied on
financial institutions have been quantified. 
• Of additional expenditures, expenses related to
the purchase of Gripen aircraft will have the most
significant effect. According to the position taken
by Eurostat in this case, expenses incurred in rela-
Central projection of GFS deficit: -5.3 per cent
Tax revenues will be higher than assumed in the +0.4 Tax revenues will remain below the central projection. -0.2
central projection.
EU support to co-financing will be lower +0.1 Measures taken to reduce spending will be -0.4
than planned. performed only in part.
Budgetary units and institutions increase their +0.2 Higher than expected increase in open-ended -0.1
carry-over funds in comparison to the early-2005 data. expenditure.
Local governments’ cash-based deficit will be lower. +0.1 Investment spending by local governments will -0.1
exceed expectations.
Impact of favourable developments  +0.8 Impact of unfavourable developments -0.8
on the balance on the balance
GFS deficit in a favourable case -4.5 GFS deficit in an unfavourable case -6.1
Table 4-7
Major factors of uncertainty in the GFS deficit projection for 2005
(as a percentage of GDP)
tion to the procurement of the aircraft must be
recorded in the years in which the planes are
delivered. 
• We have calculated changes in the accrual-
based net interest balance on the basis of our own
estimates. 
• The rest of revenues and expenditures is
assumed to change in line with GDP.
Our analysis above indicates the expected extent
of the measures the government is supposed to
take in order to cut the deficit as scheduled in the
Convergence Programme. In our estimate, the
aggregate effect of the known fiscal developments
and the announced government measures may
increase the ESA deficit by approximately 2.9 per
cent of GDP in 2006 in comparison to the expec-
tations relevant to 2005. As a result of the current-
ly known determinants, the 2007 ESA deficit would
be higher by another 0.2 per cent of GDP com-
pared to the ESA deficit recorded in the previous
year. The announced government measures (tax
cuts) would significantly increase the 2007 deficit;
however, this impact will be partly offset by factors
independent of the government (interest expendi-
ture, pension indexation and the investment cycle
of local governments).
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Table 4-8
Measures required for achieving the scheduled 2006-2007 deficit cuts
(estimate on the basis of the currently quantifiable determinants
20
)
2006* 2007* Complete
1) The impact of the announced tax reduction -1.5 -1.1 -2.6
2) Secondary effects of tax cuts +0.5 +0.2 +0.7
3) New tax-increasing measures +0.3 0.0 +0.3
4) EU relations and customs tariffs 0.0 +0.1 +0.1
5) One-off revenue losses -1.2 -0.2 -1.4
6) Pension and pharmaceutical subsidies 0.0 +0.3 +0.3
7) Family subsidies -0.4 +0.2 -0.2
8) Additional expenditure (for the most part: purchase of Gripen aircraft) -0.6 -0.1 -0.7
9) Local government investment cycle -0.2 +0.2 0.0
10) Net interest balance +0.2 +0.2 +0.4
11) Total determinants (1+…+10) -2.9 -0.2 -3.1
12) Targeted change in the ESA balance (plan) +0.6 +0.6 +1.2
13) Balance change to be supported by measures (11-12) -3.5 -0.8 -4.3
* Change of ESA balance as a percentage of GDP, relative to expected performance in the previous year. Negative sign denote deficit increasing effects.
20
The estimate includes the expected effects of the measures announced up to 27 June 2005. No calculations of our own have been made to assess
the effects of the tax measures published on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office, as the specific amendments to the tax regulations and the
draft codifications of amended tax acts in relation to the announced changes in the tax system are still unknown.
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4.3. Developments in the external balance
The current account deficit amounted to EUR 1.5
billion, while the surplus in the capital balance
reached EUR 170 million in 2005 Q1. Adjusted for
the temporary effects exerted by Hungary’s EU
accession last year, the seasonally adjusted GDP-
proportionate external borrowing requirement was
similar to what was experienced in the previous
quarter, standing at 7.4 per cent.
There was no material change in the external bor-
rowing requirement relative to 2004 Q4 despite the
fact that the seasonally adjusted GDP-proportion-
ate borrowing requirement of the consolidated
general government, adjusted for temporary
effects, grew from 9 per cent in the previous quar-
ter to 12 per cent in 2005 Q1. The underlying rea-
son for this is that the increase in households’ net
lending and the decrease in the corporate sector’s
borrowing requirement offset the increase in the
general government borrowing requirement.
Households’ net financial savings grew signifi-
cantly, with their seasonally adjusted value
amounting to 3.8 per cent of GDP. The increase in
financial savings was also attributable to tempo-
rary effects, such as government transfers (e.g.
the so-called 13th month wage and part of the
13th month pension). The significant increase in
the joint GDP-proportionate borrowing require-
ment of the general government and the house-
hold sector relative to the previous quarter was off-
set by a fall of a similar amount in the corporate
sector’s borrowing requirement, which sprang a
surprise in a number of respects (see Box 4-5 on
the adjustment of foreign trade data to other data
series). The possible underlying reasons include
reduction in the costs of inventory investment and
rise in the profit posted by financial corporations.
(Financial corporations’ GDP-proportionate net
lending was significant in 2005 Q1).
Table 4-9
Current account and financing by sectors
(as a per cent of GDP)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Estimate Projection
I. Consolidated general government** -5.2 -8.9 -8.6 -8.4 -9.4
II. Private sector (=1+2) -0.4 2.0 -0.2 0.0 2.5
1. Households 5.2 2.7 0.1 1.8 3.1
2. Corporations -5.6 -0.7 -0.4 -1.8 -0.7*
Financing requirement (=I+II) -5.6 -6.9 -8.8 -8.4 -6.9*
Current account balance -6.3 -7.2 -8.8 -8.8 -7.6*
- EUR billions -3.6 -5.0 -6.4 -7.1 -6.7
* Trade satistics uncertainty (see Box 4-5) may imply a higher current account balance by nearly 1 per cent of GDP. ** Consolidated general government
includes the central budget, local governments, ÁPV Rt., the government’s quasi-fiscal activity and the MNB.
Under our projection, the GDP-proportionate bor-
rowing requirement of the consolidated general
government may be 1 percentage point higher in
2005 than in 2004, exceeding 9 per cent. By con-
trast, households’ net financial savings may grow
at a faster rate, by 1.3 percentage points. Judging
from the surprisingly low borrowing requirement in
Q1 and the available data in Q2, we anticipate,
contrary to our previous projection, a moderation
in the corporate sector’s GDP-proportionate net
borrowing requirement. Thus, although our per-
ception of the combined GDP-proportionate bor-
rowing requirement of the general government
and the household sector has not changed mate-
rially since May, we have revised down our pro-
jection for the external borrowing requirement to
6.9% of GDP, which, with an increase in the capi-
tal balance surplus, translates into a current
account deficit amounting to EUR 6.7 billion.
However, we must emphasise that, based on other
available data series on the economy, the risk that
the trade deficit and, hence, the current account
deficit may exceed the 2005 figure published in
official statistics by as much as EUR 1 billion, i.e.
approximately 1 per cent of GDP, is significant (for
a detailed treatment of the topic, see Box 4-5).
Thus, a sharp rise in the current account deficit
projected for 2006 can be attributed to two factors.
Firstly, it reflects increased imports that arose from
the financial settlement of the fees paid for the
lease of Gripen fighter planes and amounted to
0.5% of GDP; secondly, our reservations concern-
ing the persistence of an improve in external bal-
ance as experienced in 2005 H1.
Given the structure of the current account, the real
economic deficit may significantly shrink in 2005 as
a result of an accelerating export growth and slow
expansion of domestic absorption. In addition to a
fall in the net income outflow related to non-debt
generating capital and unchanged net interest
expenses, the income account deficit is also likely to
decline somewhat. As a result, the GDP-proportion-
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Table 4-10
Structure of the current account
(as a percentage of GDP, unless indicated otherwise)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Actual Projection
1. External balance of goods -1.5 -2.4 -4.5 -3.0 -2.2* -2.9** -2.0**
and services
2. Income account -5.5 -5.6 -5.1 -6.1 -5.9 -6.1 -6.1
3. Balance of current transfers 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5
I. Current account balance (1+2+3) -6.2 -7.2 -8.8 -8.8 -7.6* -8.6** -7.6**
Current account balance -3.6 -5.0 -6.4 -7.1 -6.7* -8.0** -7.6**
in EUR billions
II. Capital balance 0.6 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.8
External financing (I+II) -5.6 -6.9 -8.8 -8.4 -6.9* -7.8** -6.8**
* Trade satistics uncertainty (see Box 4-5) may imply a higher current account balance by near 1 per cent of the GDP. ** The projection allows for imports
accounting for approximately 0.5 per cent of GDP, attributable to the settlement of the lease fees of Gripen planes rented by the Hungarian Army.
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ate current account deficit may, overall, be 1.2 per-
centage point lower than last year. In 2006, mostly
as a result of the one-off effect of the Grpien lease
agreement that adds to the current account deficit,
the real economic deficit may temporarily rise,
which, provided that the income account deficit
remains roughly unchanged, projects an increase in
the GDP-proportionate current account deficit.
A spectacularly sharp fall in external borrowing, which is sug-
gested by developments in net exports based on import data for
H1, is at variance with other data available on the economy.
This leads to uncertainty about the perception of improvement
in the external balance. Our preliminary analyses suggest that
the amount of external borrowing in 2005 may easily fall short
of the extent that the current state of the economy justifies by
over 1 per cent of GDP. Low import figures may also cause
higher GDP figures for this year (see Section 2.1).
Available foreign trade data for the first 6 months in 2005
reveal that exports grew steadily, while demand for imports
increased only moderately over the period surveyed. As a
result, the trade deficit fell considerably. In our opinion, one
of the reasons for the revealed low import can be the change
in the statistical measurement. Prior to Hungary’s accession
to the EU, foreign trade data were based on customs statistics.
As from May 2004, regarding the EU-25 trade they are based
on questionnaire-based surveys, i.e. self-declaration, which
may, as international experience confirms, cause lower relia-
bility of foreign trade statistics, and especially a downward
bias in imports.
21
This is suggested by a breakdown by countries revealing
that, in contrast to the pre-accession period, the volume of
exports from the EU-25 has declined since Hungary’s
accession to the EU, i.e. since the switchover to the ques-
tionnaire survey-based statistics. The volume of imports
calculated from consumption, capital formation and the
estimated import demand of exports also indicates higher
import levels, as it has been more than EUR 1 billion high-
er over the past year than that of actual imports, i.e. other
economic trends imply higher imports and hence a higher
trade deficit.
22
The GDP statistics also indicate that the underlying import
may be higher than the officially recorded one. A reduction in
the trade deficit entails an increase in net exports in GDP
terms. If the improvement in net exports is merely the out-
come of announced imports that are lower than actual
imports, then – in order to ensure consistency with data on the
production – higher net exports must be offset by lower values
in the ‘Changes in inventories and other unspecified absorp-
tion’ row, also consisting of errors, in the GDP statistics. In
2005 Q1, seasonally adjusted GDP-proportionate inventories
fell to the lowest level to date, which also points to a trade de-
ficit that is higher than has been identified.
Developments in the financing capacity of sectors also point
to the significant risk that the recent improvement in exter-
nal balance may prove only temporary, due to the downward
bias in imports. An explanation for this is that, based on
available data, the massively falling external financing
requirement is closely related to a fall in the corporate sec-
tor borrowing requirement rather than the reduction in the
combined borrowing requirement of the household and gen-
eral government sectors. An analysis of sectoral positions
compiled on the basis of net export data for the first half sug-
Box 4-5 Questions concerning developments in imports and the 
external balance
21
In the UK, for example, it was only noticed in 2003 that for several years imports from the EU had not been fully reflected in official statistics, due
a series of VAT frauds; this led to an upward revision of the current account deficit for 2001–2002 by 0.7–1.0 per cent of GDP. For more details, see
the August 2003 issue of the Bank of England’s Inflation Report and ‘VAT missing trader intra-Community fraud: the effect on Balance of Payments
statistics and UK National Accounts’, Economic Trends, No. 597 (August 2003).
22
For this calculation we used import trend corrected for the 2004 distortionary effects, see the note to Chart 2-10 in Section 2.1.
Financing the current account deficit
The risk perception of the structure of financing
deteriorated somewhat in 2005 Q1. In spite of a
relatively high volume of direct investment, the
proportion of non-debt generating financing fell to
40 per cent in Q1 from 85 per cent in 2004 Q3 and
65 per cent in 2004 Q4. The underlying reason for
this was residents’ significant investments in equi-
ty and portfolio securities and low reinvested earn-
ings for seasonal reasons.
As for debt generating financing, non-residents
increased their govenment securities and net fo-
rint deposit holdings significantly, by EUR 780 mil-
lion. Households’ unfailing demand for foreign cur-
rency loans – that is borrowed by the banking sys-
tem abroad – resulted in a EUR 550 million rise in
their exchange rate exposure. The corporate sec-
tor’s net foreign debt continued to fall further sig-
nificantly, albeit at a decelerating pace, with the
decrease amounting to approximately EUR 470
million.
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gests that, quite unusually, the corporate sector became a
net saver in the period. For this to materialise, companies
must have reduced their capital formation costs, while step-
ping up exports. Such a scenario would hardly be justifiable
economically. Nor is it substantiated by other available data.
For this reason, there is a high probability that the improve-
ment in Hungarian firms’ position will prove only transient
and that the sector will not maintain its net saving position
for long.
All this points to the observation that the value of imports may
be underestimated in the foreign trade statistics relative to
what can be estimated on the basis of cyclical developments.
In other words, the improvement in net exports can be attrib-
uted to the change in statistical measurement. It is important
to keep this in mind in order to avoid swings in investor senti-
ment with a potential impact on financial market develop-
ments as investors closely monitor developments in the trade
balance, GDP and the external financing requirement.
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Table 4-11
External financing requirement
(EUR millions)
2003 2004 2004 2005
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
1. External financing requirement -6396 -1371 -2172 -1680 -1573 -6796 -1326
1.1 Current account balance -6364 -1308 -2253 -1850 -1707 -7118 -1497
1.2 Capital account balance -32 -63 -81 170 134 322 171
2. Financing 6929 1238 2574 1648 2864 8324 2915
2.1 Direct investment 443 409 483 1324 680 2896 714
2.1.1. Direct investment abroad -1466 -252 -99 44 -119 -427 -377
2.1.2. Direct investment in Hungay 1909 661 582 1280 79 3323 1091
2.2 Borrowing by consolidated general 2385 905 74 1353 1464 3796 2051
government
2.2.1. Borrowing by the MNB -1849 -738 -25 -61 -26 -848 -475
2.2.2. Borrowing by Government 2512 861 691 450 1579 3580 2051
(excluding securities)
2.2.3. Purchases of government securities 1722 781 -592 964 -89 1064 475
by non-resident
2.3 Net borrowing by private sector 3884 50 1960 -979 631 1662 315
2.3.1. Borrowing by credit institutions 3214 314 1939 107 1028 3389 864
2.3.2 Portfolio investment (equities) 223 326 98 99 314 837 -175
2.3.3 Net borrowing by companies abroad 448 -590 -78 -1185 -711 -2564 -374
2.4 Net errors and omissions 216 -126 57 -51 90 -30 -166
3. Change in international reserves (1+2) 532 -133 402 -32 1292 1528 1589
According to the five-year tax reduction pro-
gramme, the standard 25 per cent VAT rate will fall
to 20 per cent as from 1 January 2006. At the
same time, however, in order to offset the resultant
loss in VAT revenues, the amount of the excise
duty imposed on tobacco and alcoholic bever-
ages and registration duty on passenger cars will
rise.
The effects of VAT reduction fall into three cate-
gories: direct and indirect effects as well as those
exerted by expectations. While preparing our pro-
jection, we did not take the latter, i.e. that a tem-
porary low increase in consumer prices would
feed through to long-term inflation expectations,
into consideration. The reason for doing so is that
no similar phenomena were seen after increase in
the VAT rates in 2004. What did occur was that
both employers and employees ignored the result-
ant temporary increase in prices, and inflation
expectations did not rise persistantly either.
However, experience from the increase in VAT
rates in 2004 provides only modest help with the
assessment of the expected impact of the current
measures. The main underlying reason is that
there was an increase in VAT rates in 2004, while
current measures lead to reduction in the tax
rates. Further, we assume that companies pass
increases in taxes on to consumers more inten-
sively than decreases. Moreover, while the meas-
ures in 2004 left tradables unaffected, the current
ones will affect them to the largest extent. There
are two lessons to be learnt from trends in 2004.
Consistent with our expectations, consumer prices
grew to a lesser degree than what would have
been justified by the technical impact of the rise in
VAT rates, i.e. pass-through was incomplete.
Immediate effects took a very short time (a month
or two) to emerge, while indirect ones materialised
over a longer period of time.
23
Lower VAT rates causes a one-off reduction in the
price level
The short-term impact of lower VAT rates is dis-
cernible in commodity markets. In order to provide
an estimate for such an impact, the extent to which
the consumer price level would fall if economic
participants fully adjusted their gross prices to
changes in VAT rates could serve as a sound
basis. At this juncture, we assume that there will
be no change in the corporate profit mark-up. The
figure thus calculated is referred to as the techni-
cal impact of the VAT rate cuts on the consumer
price level. We calculate it to stand at close to -1.9
percentage points.
Markets differ in the strength of competition, the
price elasticity of demand and the transparency of
prices.
24
Sluggish competition, low price elasticity
of demand and low price transparency may spur
companies to reduce their gross sales prices to a
level that is lower than the VAT rate cuts and
increase their profit margin in the short run. The dif-
ference between the technical impact exerted by
the VAT rate cuts and the actual immediate change
in consumer prices is referred to as the profit
impact of the VAT rate cuts on the price level.
4.4. The macroeconomic impact of the 2006 
VAT reduction
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23
Experience to be drawn from the rise in indirect taxes in 2004 bears only limited relevance to the measures in 2006, due to the differences in the
macro-economic environment. The most important difference lies in the fact that while in 2004 consumer demand was slowing down and the
exchange rate of the forint strengthened, now the former is increasing slightly and the latter is stable.
24
Products with high price transparency are those where VAT rates are clearly separated from net prices, as is the case of e.g. landline phone tariffs.
Special topics
65
Table 4-12
Determinants of direct effects by product groups
In order to provide an estimate for the profit impact,
the goods and services included in the consumer
price index were categorised on the basis of three
decisive characteristics (competition, the price
elasticity of demand and price transparency). The
profit impact is practically negligible in the case of
the most transparent goods (e.g. certain deregu-
lated prices and fuels). Here, the VAT rate cuts are
reflected in their entirety in the reduction in price
levels. On the other extreme are market services,
where competition is less strong and price elastic-
ity of demand and price transparency is also low.
We estimated the profit impact at two-thirds, thus
only one-third of the VAT rate cuts is reflected in
consumer prices. Tradables, where competition is
fierce, the price elasticity of demand is relatively
high and price transparency is moderate, repre-
sent an in-between category. We estimate that
four-fifths of the VAT rate cuts is reflected immedi-
ately in consumer prices, thus the profit impact is
an estimated one-fifth. Processed food responds
similarly to tradables. However, in this case the
proportion of the goods affected by VAT rate cuts
is relatively low.
The combined technical and profit effects on the
consumer price level are referred to as direct
impact. Our estimates show that it stands at 1.4
per cent with respect to the consumer price index.
Weight Demand Competition Transparency Ratio affected Impact on Pass-through Impact
price of prices by tax profit (%)** (%)*** of VAT
elasticity cuts (%)* reduction****
Foods 18.1 medium medium/ medium 9 10 90 -0.3
intensive
processed 5.9 - - - - - - -
unprocessed 12.2 medium intensive medium 13 10 90 -0.5
Tradables 27.4 medium/high intensive medium 85 20 80 -2.7
Market 18.8 low/medium mixed low/medium 56 67 33 -0.7
services
Market-priced 1.7 - - - - - - -
energy
Alcohol and 9.2 - - - - - - -
tobacco
Motor fuels 4.6 high intensive high 100 0 100 -4.0
Regulated 20.3 low sluggish high 39 6 94 -1.5
prices
Consumer 100.0 - - - 48 26 74 -1.4
price index
Core inflation 66.0 - - - 52 34 66 -1.4
* The proportion of products affected by changes in VAT rates among the relevant products. ** Profit impact: the proportion of the VAT rate cuts that is
not reflected in (gross) consumer prices. *** Pass-through: the proportion of the VAT rate cuts that is reflected in (gross) consumer prices. **** Impact
of VAT rate cuts: impact on the 2006 price level of the relevant group (percentage points).
Indirect impact of VAT rate cuts is more likely to
generate inflation
The VAT rate cut-induced reduction in the price
level may gradually influence developments in
other macroeconomic variables (e.g. real wages
and hence consumption), which may in turn affect
prices as well. These macroeconomic trends are
referred to as the indirect impact of VAT rate cuts
on inflation. While direct effects mean one-off cor-
rections in the consumer price level, indirect ones
may influence longer-term inflation.
In our estimate, the direct impact of the VAT rate
cuts will raise the disposable income of house-
holds to an extent that is identical to the direct
impact. Positive real income shocks lead to a rise
in household consumption that is more even than
that of income. A pick-up in consumer demand
also boosts import demand. As a result, the invig-
orating effect of VAT rate cuts on GDP will also be
somewhat more modest than what would follow
from their impact on consumption.
Our calculations show no significant cost-side fac-
tors of inflation reflected in the indirect effects of
the VAT rate cuts. By contrast, supply-side factors
are present. Wage adjustment to changed prices
is relatively slow and gradual. In consequence,
real wages calculated at consumer prices
increase over a span of a year or two. They are fur-
ther boosted by increasing aggregate demand
that invigorates labour demand (and hence
wages). This may well have (adverse) effects on
employment as well; however, in our estimate,
they are not significant. Overall, GDP will be high-
er, which will entail demand-pull inflation, as an
increasingly wide output gap pushes prices up.
Demand-pull inflation somewhat mutes direct
(technical and profit) effects on the price level.
According to our estimates, indirect effects may
precipitate a 0.1-0.2-percentage point rise in infla-
tion with respect to the consumer price index and
core inflation in 2007.
In sum, our estimates suggest that the announced
VAT rate cuts will, as a combined effect of direct
and indirect effects, contribute to GDP growth by
0.1–0.2 percentage points. Meanwhile, the growth
rate of households’ purchased consumption will
be over half a per cent higher in both 2006 and
2007 than it would if there were no VAT rate cuts.
The overall impact on the consumer price index
and core inflation is estimated at 1.4 per cent in
the first year (i.e in 2006), while the indirect effects
of the VAT rate cuts may result in 0.1–0.2 percent-
age point higher inflation indices.
The question arises as to which of the effects of
the VAT rate cuts is captured by what is called the
constant tax rate index published by the CSO. As
the constant tax rate index only filters the technical
impact from the consumer price index, it is unable
to capture either profit or indirect effects.
Accordingly, it will be higher in 2006 than a (hypo-
thetical) indicator, i.e. ‘what would have happened
if there had been no VAT rate cuts’, that would be
able to filter the entire impact of the VAT rate cuts
from the price index.
As a result of the planned VAT cuts, we expect the
constant tax rate price index to exceed the con-
sumer price index by 1.9 percentage points in
2006 (other changes, e.g. the assumed hike in
excise duties might decrease this somewhat).
It should be borne in mind that under extremely
tight labour market conditions employees would
be able to ‘get hold of’ the bulk of the profit earned
on VAT rate cuts. Under such a scenario cost-
push and demand-pull inflation would be higher
than what was outlined above. If such a scenario
materialises, the estimated indirect impact on
inflation may amount to 0.5 and 0.3 percentage
points with respect to core inflation and the con-
sumer price index respectively in 2007.
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Table 4-13
Macroeconomic effects of the VAT rate cuts
(year-on-year indices, percentage point)
GDP Households’ purchased Private sector Consumer 
consumption nominal wages price index
Direct effects
Technical effect
- - - -1.9
Profit effect
2006 end-Q1
- - - +0.5
Aggregate direct effects 
- - - -1.4
Indirect effects
2006 +0.2 +0.7 0.0 +0.0
2007 +0.1 +0.5 0.1 +0.1 - +0.2
Aggregate impact
2006 +0.2 +0.7 0.0 -1.4
2007 +0.1 +0.5 +0.1 +0.1 - +0.2
According to an official statement of the govern-
ment, in 2006 the statutory minimum wage will
increase from the current uniform HUF 57,000 in a
differentiated manner to HUF 63,000 70,000 and
77,000 thousand for people with primary, second-
ary and tertiary qualifications, respectively.
25
The
announced measure implies significant increases
in the different qualification categories, namely: 10,
23 and 35 per cent. With regard to the effects of
rises in the statutory minimum wage on our inflation
projection, the following should be considered.
(1) Direct impact: The number of people con-
cerned and the effect on wages; effects in addi-
tion to official statistics.
(2) Expected spillover effects.
Assessment of the direct effects of rises in the 
statutory minimum wage
Direct effect means the increase caused in the
CSO’s official wage index by the fact that those
who have been paid less than the statutory mini-
mum wage will work for the statutory minimum.
26
The assessment of the direct effect, however, rais-
es several concerns. The most obvious solution
would be to use the method described in a study
by Kertesi and Köllõ (2003),
27
however, no individ-
ual distribution is available for wages. For this rea-
son, we have resorted to a method that results in a
rough estimate but captures the right dimensions.
(1) On the basis of the moments of distribution
specified in the CSO’s publication,
28
the distribu-
tions of the various wage categories were estimat-
ed. As the most recent data referred to 2003, the
planned 2006 rise was discounted retrospectively
to 2003 by the whole economy wage rises per-
formed between 2003 and 2005. The people
below the wage obtained as a result were consid-
ered as affected by the 2006 rise. 
(2) Those who were found to earn less than the mi-
nimum wage calculated as above were classified
into the minimum wage category, and this way we
could define the aggregate wage shock caused
by the minimum wage increase to the people con-
cerned. No wage changes were calculated for
people earning more than the statutory minimum
wage. However, a wage shock was not consid-
ered simply as wage rises for people earning less
than the statutory minimum, such a shock was
rather compared to the increase in their wages rel-
ative to the May 2005 wage projection.
In order to check the reliability of the above-
described rough assessment, we also calculated
the effects of the 2001 rise and compared our
results with the estimate obtained by Kertesi and
Köllõ (2003) on the basis of a full wage distribution.
29
4.5. Assessment of the effects of the envisaged minimum
wage increase
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25
See http://www.meh.hu/tevekenyseg/tevekhirek/ig20050628.html# [in Hungarian only].
26
This definition is used deliberately, as we have already indicated on several occasions that the official wage statistics, especially pertaining to the
statutory minimum wages, fail to correspond to the official wage index.
27
Kertesi, G. and Köllõ, J. (2003) The Employment Effect of Nearly Doubling the Minimum Wage – The Case of Hungary, Budapest Working Paper
on the Labour Market 2003/6.
28
Employment, wage and earnings data for 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003. Whole economy total, National Employment Office, Labour Data Bank.
29
The first step in our assessment roughly reflected the whole economy indicator for the number of people affected by the 2001 rise, although our
estimate was significantly lower for people with secondary qualifications. Overall, a 0.5% higher shock was assessed in our estimation than in the
quoted study, which was subsequently adjusted by sensitivity tests. According to our calculations, the difference results primarily from the fact that
the method is sensitive to our assumption made for the lower end of the distribution. As the specific value of the shock changes fundamentally in
line with our perception of the average wage of those who earn less than the statutory minimum prior to the wage increase, in the 2001 assessment
the average wage below the statutory minimum was adjusted to reflect the estimate by Kertesi-Köllõ (2003). The above adjustment was then car-
ried over to 2006, assuming that the average wage of people earning less than the statutory minimum had been assessed with a similar bias as for
2001.
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The achieved results suggest that the 2001 wage
increase affected primarily people with primary
qualifications, while the 2006 rise may affect peo-
ple with secondary qualifications. Regarding the
impact on wages, it seems that the shock to be
caused by the 2006 rise may amount to approxi-
mately half the impact of the 2001 rise.
30
Then the data obtained for the whole economy
was divided into two sectors: the private and the
public sector, and equal distribution was
assumed in them. We assumed, however, that in
the public sector people with tertiary qualifica-
tions would not be affected by the wage rise, as
they already earned above HUF 100,000 as a
statutory minimum.
No tax evasion was considered in respect of the
institutional data, despite the fact that based on
anecdotal information major businesses evidently
practise it. It is presumable, however, that the
practice of reporting employees to the tax author-
ity at the statutory minimum wage is more charac-
teristic of the self-employed, and our calculations
actually reveal that for businesses employing less
than five persons the statutory minimum wage
increase can be considered as a tax hike rather
than as additional income.
Comparing the above factors we have come to the
conclusion that the minimum wage increase can
be considered as an upside risk on wage costs in
the entire business sector (either on account of the
actual rise in wages or due to the mandatory
increase in the duties payable on wages), where-
as in terms of household real income, the wage
increasing impact and the tax increasing impact
will offset one another. This is tantamount to say-
ing that the aggregate household income will not
rise simply on account of the rise in the statutory
minimum wage.
Finally, it is important to note that the 2006 mini-
mum wage rise will take place simultaneously with
a significant cut in the VAT rates, resulting in a 1.4
per cent drop in the CPI. As the VAT cut will
change consumer prices in a way that ceteris
paribus the producer prices remain unchanged,
the employers and employees can share the ‘pro-
fit’ made this way in the framework of a labour mar-
ket bargain, by increasing wages at lower than
originally envisaged rates. The specific division of
the government’s withdrawal between them
depends on the relative elasticity of labour
demand and supply. Hungarian literature on the
subject suggests that labour demand is relatively
sensitive to wages, while the activity data reveal
that labour supply is relatively insensitive to it. For
this reason, 85 per cent of the impact of the VAT
reduction expected to be beneficial for con-
30
As mentioned above, in comparison with the more accurate estimate by Kertesi and Köllõ (2003), our assessment for 2001 was mistaken pre-
cisely with regard to people with secondary qualifications, and therefore, the results should be viewed with a measure of scepticism. As, however,
in comparison to Kertesi and Köllõ (2003), this method underestimated the involvement of the people falling into this category, the risk is implied
more in the fact that those with secondary qualifications may be slightly more affected than assessed by us, in other words, the impact is even
more significant than it was in 2001.
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sumers, i.e. this measure will ceteris paribus hard-
ly reduce producer real wages.
Complex spillover effects may arise
The effects of a minimum wage increase are not
simple short-term effects on the people directly
affected. As mentioned above, it is likely to affect
employment, and still beyond. From a macroeco-
nomic perspective, the statutory minimum wage
represents a shock in labour costs, which
changes corporate cost functions and thus ulti-
mately affects prices and output.
Below is a brief summary of the mechanism by
which the minimum wage affects macroeconomic
factors. Statutory minimum wage increases may
result in two extreme situations depending on our
labour market assumptions (perfect competition
versus monopsony). A rise in the statutory mini-
mum wage may reduce or increase employment.
Due, however, to the inelasticity of labour supply
and other related uncertainties, we have divided
the first case into two distinct simulations. In the
central scenario described in this Report, case (A)
is taken as a basis, and the effects of other ver-
sions are included among risks.
(A) Labour market is free of imperfections, however,
labour supply fails to change as a result of the 
minimum wage shock (main scenario)
In this case, employment decreases ceteris
paribus, and as labour supply fails to change, the
rate of unemployment rises exclusively due to
falling labour demand. In the long run, rising
unemployment curbs spread in wage rises. As a
result of the wage shock, labour costs and conse-
quently the inflation rate rise. In the short term,
GDP may rise (real wage impact), however, over
the longer term it falls as a result of a lower
employment equilibrium.
(B) The labour market is free of imperfections, 
however labour supply increases as a result of 
the minimum wage shock
This case is extremely similar to the previous one
disregarding the fact that effects are more pro-
nounced. This is because unemployment increas-
es as a result of both falling demand and rising
supply. Employment equilibrium, and consequent-
ly potential output , however, remain unchanged.
A faster rise in unemployment, however, moder-
ates initial price rises more than in the previous
two cases.
(C) The labour market is characterised by 
monopsonistic competition.
In the case of monopsony, a rise in the statutory
minimum wage increases equilibrium employ-
ment, and consequently, also the potential output.
For this reason, its effects differ from cases (A)
and (B). This is because the rise in the potential
output results in a far more moderate impact on
prices and wages than in the first two cases.
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